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1. Executive Summary  
The rule of law, in its most basic form, is based on the principles that society is governed openly 
and fairly according to widely known and accepted rules; that no one is above the law, including 
those in authority; and that justice is accessible to all (Bara and Bara, 2017, 24-25; Mavrikos-
Adamou, 2014; Memeti, 2014). A country operates under “rule of law” when it has, among other 
institutions and services, a legislature that enacts laws in accordance with the constitution and 
human rights; an independent judiciary; effective and accessible legal services; and a legal 
system guaranteeing equality before the law (Gome, 2017). Both the quality of laws (clear, 
general, stable, coherent and enforced laws) and quality of the judicial system (capable, 
independent, accountable and impartial) are important to the rule of law (Mendelski, 2018).  
Rule of law reform is a complex, expensive, and challenging issue, due to the heterogeneity of 
means, goals, opinions, agendas, and priorities of diverse stakeholders (Mendelski, 2018). 
Practitioners and legal experts have differed in their views and understanding of how rule of law 
can be established. International donors have also emphasised a wide range of issues to 
establish the rule of law, such as judicial capacity building (EU, USAID, and World Bank); respect 
for human rights and a fair trial (ECHR); countering corruption, judicial independence, impartiality 
and training (Council of Europe and EU); and law and order and minority rights (OSCE) 
(Mendelski, 2018). The vagueness of the concept of the rule of law can undermine the 
effectiveness of rule of law reforms (Ilievski, 2014). 
Establishing the rule of law remains a key challenge in the Western Balkans. Progress in the 
region, while different across countries, is slow (Mendelski, 2018; Milošević and Muk, 2016). The 
rule of law criterion has emerged as one of the top priorities and key concerns in EU enlargement 
policies for the region (Elbasani and Šabić, 2017). The EU Commission’s new enlargement 
strategy emphasises that “the rule of law must be strengthened significantly” (EC, 2018). 
Strengthening the rule of law is not only an institutional issue, but also requires societal 
transformation in the countries and incorporation of particular fundamental values into daily 
culture (Hoxhaj, 2018). 
This report discusses the key challenges faced by countries in the Western Balkans in the area 
of rule of law and the experience of relevant reform efforts. Given the breadth of this topic, the 
report is based on a review of literature published during the past five years. They comprise 
primarily of academic literature, NGO reports, and EC and US government status reports. There 
are very limited donor evaluations or discussions of particular projects and programming readily 
available. In addition, academic and NGO literature rarely refer to specific donor projects and 
programmes, but rather discuss reforms more generally. A key commonality in academic and 
NGO literature is the critique that donors have not paid sufficient attention in their reform efforts 
to issues of pervasive politicisation and historical legacies in the region that impinge on the 
current culture and environment. There has also been inadequate attention to the need for 
accountability. As such, reform progress can be constrained. In some instances, reforms may 
even produce negative unintended consequences, such as by pushing for strong, independent 
judicial councils, when members are still politicised and subject to political influences. 
The topics and challenges that receive the greatest focus in the literature are judicial 
independence and corruption. Other challenges that receive substantial attention are judicial 
efficiency; war crimes prosecution; media freedom and protection; minority protection; and 
asylum frameworks. These will be discussed first on a regional basis, based on literature that 
covers the region as a whole, followed by findings from country-specific literature.  
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Judicial independence: The judicial systems of the Western Balkans are adversely affected by 
politicisation of the judiciary, undue influences and judicial corruption (Anastasi, 2018; Taleski et 
al., 2016). The establishment of an independent judiciary has been one of the key reform 
priorities in EU accession processes (Bobek and Kosar, 2014).  An extensive study on 
monitoring and evaluating the rule of law in the region finds, however, that there is no significant 
progress regarding independence (Milošević and Muk, 2016). Institutional reform has often been 
limited to promoting judicial councils, which are typically independent intermediary bodies, 
designed to insulate the functions of appointment, promotion and discipline of judges and other 
judicial staff from partisan political processes (Takacs, 2018; Bobek and Kosar, 2014). Judicial 
academies, heavily promoted by the EU, have also been established to improve the quality of 
judicial education and judicial effectiveness and efficiency (Ilievski, 2014). The introduction of 
“strong” judicial councils and academies, however, without adequate internal reform (e.g. 
transformation of culture, political maturity, clarity on separation of powers) has led to the 
emergence of new channels of political interference, resulting in the persistence of dependent 
judges. There has thus been continued political influence in the operation of the judiciary, 
particularly in the case of appointments, promotions and case allocation (Takacs, 2018; Imeri et 
al., 2018; Fagan, 2016; Bobek and Kosar, 2014). Attention to judicial accountability, which acts 
as an effective “check and balance” to judicial independence, is essential, but has received much 
less attention until very recently (Anastasi, 2018; Taleski et al., 2016; Bobek and Kosar, 2014). In 
its absence, granting judges from the socialist period too much independence, can enable 
threats from internal and external actors (Preshova et al., 2017; Fagan, 2016). 
Judicial efficiency: Many years of neglect and underinvestment have undermined judicial 
efficiency and access to justice in the Western Balkans (Hoxhaj, 2018). In most countries, there 
are long court delays and a high backlog of cases (Hoxhaj, 2018; Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). 
Digital case management systems, including audio-visual recording and transcription of court 
proceedings, could make courts more transparent and easier to access. They can also reduce 
corruption and increasing public confidence in the judicial process (Hoxhaj, 2018).   
Corruption and organised crime: Systemic corruption and organised crime are persistent 
problems in all Western Balkan countries, despite successes in strengthening relevant legal 
frameworks and setting up anti-corruption institutions (Čeperković and Gaub, 2018; EPSC, 2018; 
Sanfey and Milatovic, 2018; Ciero, 2016). Curbing overarching politicization in the region is 
essential to countering corruption effectively, alongside technical reforms (Milošević and Muk, 
2016). While corruption undermines the functioning of the judiciary, the lack of independence of 
the judiciary also undermine adequate processing of corruption cases (Imeri et al., 2018; Ungar, 
2017; Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). There is a consistently poor track record of prosecuting and 
punishing corruption and organised crime, particularly among high-level officials (Imeri et al., 
2018; McDevitt, 2016). This is due in large part to political interference, inadequate institutional 
capacities, and lack of institutional cooperation (McDevitt, 2016; Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016).  
War crimes prosecution: Past and ongoing approaches to the prosecution of war criminals in 
the region have been piecemeal, failing to dismantle powerful structures of impunity (Ungar, 
2017). With the termination of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), it is now solely up to the states themselves to continue with prosecutions. Apart from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), where there is some limited progress with local prosecutions, 
other countries are falling short (Ungar, 2017). Factors behind failures in effective prosecution 
include: lack of political will; ethno-religious tensions; politicised media; and inadequate 
resources and capacity. Further, Ungar (2017) emphasises that such prosecutions have clear 
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limitations in terms of dealing specifically with individual criminal responsibility, rather than with 
changes in ideologies. The EU accession process provides an opportunity to reframe 
discussions around justice, to re-evaluate the meaning of reform and how it can be more 
effective in fighting impunity. 
Media freedom and protection: Given the absence of strong horizontal accountability in the 
region, it is even more critical that media has the capacity and freedom to hold political actors to 
account (McDevitt, 2016). Media freedom has deteriorated in recent years, however, 
characterised by political interference; corrupt ties between officials and media owners; tight 
government control; non-transparent public funding of media and financing of pro-government 
media; and intimidation of or violence against journalists. This results in (self-) censorship (Imera 
et al., 2018; Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016; McDevitt, 2016; Milošević and Muk, 2016).  
Minority protection: While legislative frameworks, strategies and action plans for protection 
against discrimination have been adopted across the region, implementation has been poor. This 
is due to lack of institutional capacities; poor understanding of the issues and how the law is 
supposed to be implemented; and absence of political will (Imeri et al., 2018; Imeri and 
Ivanovska, 2016). There have been persistent shortcomings, particularly with regard to 
discrimination against the Roma community and hostility towards the LGBTI community. Data on 
discrimination cases registered with official institutions is scarce and non-systematized, which 
hinders a quantitative overview of the situation throughout the region (Imeri et al., 2018). 
Asylum framework: Thousands of people have been trapped in Western Balkan countries that 
lack the capacity to provide functioning asylum systems (Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). The human 
resources and capacities of reception centres have yet to be increased (Imeri et al., 2018). Given 
the complex nature of the necessary reforms, however, establishing an effective asylum and 
migration framework is recognised as a long term process (Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). 
Factors affecting rule of law reforms 
Historical legacies, such as the legacies of communist judicial culture and civil war, play a role 
in a country’s degree of compliance with judicial reform and entrenchment of the rule of law 
(Mendelski, 2018; Čavalić and Gajić, 2017; Preshova et al., 2017). Western Balkan countries 
historically did not have much experience with political entities that provided sufficient rule of law 
(Čavalić and Gajić, 2017). Thus, the “European model” is based on assumptions and 
preconditions relating to a certain legal and judicial culture and mentality that is not necessarily 
present, likely limiting the success of reforms (Preshova et al. 2017). A further key challenge in 
the Western Balkans is the failure of political elites to commit to the implementation of rule of 
law standards (Imeri et al., 2018; Milošević and Muk, 2016). The politicisation and 
instrumentalisation of new laws, reforms and public institutions are critical challenges in the 
region (Mendelski, 2018; Mendelski, 2016). In addition, Mendelski (2016) finds evidence that 
many of the EU’s reformist change agents from the Western Balkans can also be obstructionist. 
Curbing overarching politicisation in the region is thus a key precondition to the establishment of 
the rule of law (Milošević and Muk, 2016) and for greater success in internationally-led 
campaigns (Elbasani, 2018a). However, progress has generally been more technical rather than 
directly focusing on politically sensitive issues (Elbasani, 2018a). Scholars advocate for a 
“fundamentals first” approach, with better attention to impartiality, such as independence and 
separation of power (Elbasani, 2018a; Šabić, 2018; Milošević and Muk, 2016). Similarly, a key 
identified problem with the EU’s rule of law reforms is its quantitative approach, which follows a 
“the more the better” mindset in the assessment of the rule of law, rather than focusing on the 
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qualitative reform processes (Mendelski, 2016).  Quantitative and technical approaches can 
not only limit impact on the ground, but also create perverse incentives and superficial outcomes. 
Mendelski (2018; 2016; 2014) finds that EU-driven rule of law reforms often contribute 
substantially to improvements in judicial capacity and substantive legality, but with adverse 
consequences on judicial impartiality. 
Insufficient knowledge & evidence 
Despite years of research, it remains unclear whether and under which conditions rule of law 
promotion and judicial reform (as advanced by the EU and international donors) establishes or 
undermines the rule of law (Mendelski, 2018). Most literature on the rule of law in Central and 
Eastern Europe proposes arguments and findings which remain restrictive and incomplete. In 
order to broaden the theoretical and methodological lens through which external rule of law 
promotion and reform can be analysed, more comprehensive and integrated explanations 
combining different methodologies, approaches, and literatures is required (Mendelski, 2018). 
Further, Mendelski (2018) argues that the EU lacks a well-elaborated methodology, sufficient to 
allow a consistent and objective evaluation of the rule of law. Most relevant studies are 
qualitative in nature and restricted to findings from single cases or geographically restricted 
regions, thus offering restrictive, non-generalisable insights about rule of law development in the 
region. There is a need for more systematic comparative studies with a larger number of cases 
that would help to determine why some countries are able to establish rule of law and others not 
(Mendelski, 2018). At the same time, Anastasi (2018) states that while a comparative analysis of 
rule of law reforms is an effective way to make conclusions and suggestions, transferring 
measures from one country to another, without sufficient analysis, can be detrimental. 
In addition, since the rule of law can mean different things to different scholars and practitioners, it 
can also be measured through different methods. This can contribute to different evaluations of 
the rule of law in a particular country (Mendelski, 2018). Assessments of the rule of law are often 
conducted narrowly and unsystematically, focusing on the quality of the judiciary, such as 
empowerment of the judiciary. This has resulted in some cases in the existence of independent 
but unaccountable judiciaries, judicial councils and constitutional courts (Mendelski, 2018).  
Country summaries 
Albania 
The judicial system in Albania continues to be affected by a high degree of political influence. 
Political interference in appointments within the judiciary and lack of oversight mechanisms 
persist (Anastasi, 2018; Elbasani, 2018; Elbasani and Šabić, 2017; McDevitt, 2016; Mavrikos-
Adamou, 2014).  The Albanian School of Magistrates suffers from inadequate budgetary 
allocations and training resources; and political influence in its management (Mitrushi, 2018; 
Fagan and Sircar, 2015).  Implementation of the vetting law, involving re-evaluating all judges 
and prosecutors, has begun (EC, 2018a; US DOS 2018a). While the EC (2018a) has 
commended the resignation of members of the judiciary, Xhepa (2018) finds that vetting 
processes can also have adverse consequences. In the case of the Constitutional Court, for 
example, the re-evaluation of judges found that seven out of nine proved to be inadequate, 
rendering the Court unable to function (Xhepa, 2018). Court management in Albania remains 
poor, with insufficient human and material resources, long delays in conducting judicial 
proceedings, and a high backlog of cases (Mavrikos-Adamou, 2014). Random allocation of 
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cases and the adoption of digital recording technology could improve the efficiency and 
transparency of court proceedings (EC, 2018a; USAID, 2015).  High levels of corruption are 
pervasive in all branches of government (Mitrushi, 2018; US DOS, 2017a). The country has 
made some progress, notably with the legal framework, and is in the process of establishing a 
chain of specialised anti-corruption bodies (EC, 2018a). However, the number of convictions of 
officials engaged in corruption or organised crime remains low (EC, 2018a; US DOS, 2018a). 
Independent media in Albania is active and able to express a wide variety of viewpoints (US 
DOS, 2018a). Media still faces challenges, however, including political pressure, resource 
constraints, and threats and violence against journalists – contributing to self-censorship 
(Mitrushi, 2018; US DOS, 2018a). There are no indications of any prosecutions or convictions for 
such violence (McDevitt, 2016). The government has recently adopted new legislation on 
minorities, which provides official minority status for nine national minorities. There are continued 
allegations of discrimination against members of the Romani and Balkan-Egyptian communities, 
including in housing, employment, health care, and education (US DOS, 2018a).  While Albania 
has in place a law on asylum, there are reports that authorities did not follow due process 
obligations for some asylum seekers and that the system lacked effective monitoring (US DOS, 
2018a). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
BiH has a stringent legal framework to ensure independence of the judiciary and prosecutors. 
The establishment of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) has been the key focus 
of EU assistance. There are continuing concerns, however, about political interference in the 
judiciary, particularly in the case of judicial appointments, transfers and removals (Hrasnica and 
Ramić-Mesihović, 2018; McDevitt, 2016; Fagan, 2016; Fagan and Sircar, 2015). Vetting 
measures have had a mild effect, partly restoring public confidence in the judiciary (Maxhuni and 
Cucchi, 2017). A reduction in the backlog for pending court cases has improved efficiency of the 
judiciary (Milošević and Muk, 2016); however, the backlog remains a persistent obstacle (EC, 
2018b). Reforms have yet to adequately improve budgeting, training and capacity building in the 
judiciary (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018; Fagan and Sircar, 2015). Corruption and 
organised crime remains widespread, despite progress with establishing a legal framework, 
strategy and action plan (EC, 2018b). Jurisprudence on corruption-related offenses is not 
harmonized; and the number of officials convicted of abuse of office and corruption is minimal 
(BTI, 2018b; OSCE, 2018).  BiH has continued to implement the national war crimes strategy 
objectives, which include tackling the backlog of cases (EC, 2018b). There have been 
weaknesses in implementation, however, including greater attention to indictments of low-level 
perpetrators rather than those who were leaders or held command responsibility (Korner, 2016). 
Most media outlets in BiH are dependent on and controlled by the ruling elite and powerful 
oligarchies. Threats and attacks against journalists and media workers do not receive adequate 
follow up by relevant police and judicial authorities (EC, 2018b; (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 
2018). BiH’s legal framework for protection of minorities has not been adequately enforced (US 
DOS, 2018b). Members of minorities continue to experience harassment and discrimination in 
various sectors (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018; US DOS, 2018b). The asylum and 
international protection system in BiH is largely in line with EU and international standards 
(Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018).   
Kosovo 
The independence of the judiciary continues to be undermined by undue political influence and 
high levels of corruption, despite legal safeguards on independence and impartiality and the 
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establishment of judicial and prosecutorial councils (BTI, 2018c; EC, 2018b).  Vetting has 
resulted in re-evaluation of judges and prosecutors, but has not had lasting effects in the 
judiciary, evident in the persistence of judicial dependence, high level of corruption and lack of 
efficiency (Maxhuni and Cucchi, 2017). Administration of justice in Kosovo is slow and inefficient, 
with a large backlog of cases and inadequate physical, technical and financial resources (BTI, 
2018c). The task of prosecuting war criminals has recently been left entirely to local prosecutors. 
There are concerns, however, that they lack sufficient capacity to deal with the cases (EC, 
2018c; Ungar, 2018). Despite the existence of an anti-corruption legal framework and various 
efforts to tackle the problem, there are minimal concrete results (BTI, 2018c; EC, 2018c; Roxcan, 
2018). Institutional overlap in anti-corruption efforts has resulted in confusion and susceptibility to 
manipulation (McDevitt, 2016). Local judges and prosecutors are often reluctant to take on cases 
of high-level corruption and organised crime, due to physical threats and fear of job loss (Dursun-
Özkanca, 2018). There are thus very few convictions (EC, 2018b; Roxcan, 2018; US DOS, 
2018c). Growing financial difficulties of media outlets, and an increase in the number of threats 
and attacks against journalists, have the potential to undermine the editorial independence of 
media outlets (EC, 2018c; US DOS, 2018c). There is minimal follow-up in the case of such 
attacks, with lack of thorough investigation and few final verdicts (Roxcan, 2018). Ethnic 
minorities and LGBTI groups have experienced varying levels of institutional and societal 
discrimination in various sectors (BTI, 2018c; US DOS, 2018c). Access to justice for non-
Albanian communities, particularly for Kosovo Serbs and displaced persons, remain a concern 
(US DOS, 2018c). In the case of migration, staff involved in asylum applications require training 
in order to more effectively implement the law on asylum (Roxcan, 2018). 
Macedonia 
Despite the adoption of the structural preconditions for judicial independence (legal framework, 
judicial councils and academies), political intervention and influence in judicial decisions are 
common (BTI, 2018d; Priebe report, 2017; Preshova et al., 2017; Jordanova and Dimovska, 
2016; McDevitt, 2016; Taleski et al., 2016; Fagan and Sircar, 2015). Wiretapped conversations, 
which emerged in late 2015, revealed that the executive has complete control over the judiciary, 
particularly with regard to appointments and promotions (Priebe report, 2017; Priebe report, 
2015).  This indicates that the judiciary was not ready for such a high level of self-government in 
the form of the judicial council (Preshova, 2018; Preshova et al., 2017). After the change of 
Government in June 2017 (and change in political climate), there has been a slight improvement 
in respecting merit-based principles in judicial appointments (Imeri and Ivanovska, 2018). The 
efficiency of the judiciary in Macedonia has improved, in terms of reduction in case backlogs. 
Corruption remains prevalent, with little concrete results in practice (BTI, 2018d; US DOS, 
2018d). While there is a track record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions on offences 
committed by low-level officials, this is limited progress with high-level corruption (EU, 2017; 
Jordanova and Dimovska, 2016). The media continues to be undermined by perceptions of 
political affiliation and influence. While intimidations, threats and violence against journalists are 
reported, there is a climate of impunity (Priebe report, 2017). There has, however, been a recent 
decline in pressure on journalists with the change in political climate. Vulnerable groups (i.e. the 
Romani, some ethnic minorities and LGTBI persons) are frequently subject to discrimination, 
denial of basic liberties, and violence (BTI, 2018d; US DOS, 2018d). There are few arrests, 
however, and failure of the government to condemn discrimination against the LGBTI community 
(US, DOS, 2018). The Law on Asylum is largely harmonized with the EU, however the UNHCR 
finds weaknesses in the mechanism for adjudicating refugee status (Imeri et al., 2018; US DOS, 
2018d). 
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Montenegro 
Despite the adoption of a legal framework and the establishment of new institutions, significant 
changes in judicial practice have yet to occur (BTI, 2018e). Attempted political interference, 
including by authorities internal to the judiciary, is a key concern (EC, 2018e). The capacities of 
the judicial and prosecutorial Councils have improved, indicated by the recruitment of judges and 
prosecutors under the new system and implementation of the new IT strategy (EC, 2018e). The 
promotion system has yet to be implemented however, and a track record of disciplinary 
responsibility is still lacking (EC, 2018e). While there has been some progress with tackling 
corruption, it remains prevalent (EC, 2018e). While the government has yet to fully implement the 
law prescribing criminal penalties for corruption (US DOS, 2018e; McDevitt, 2016), there has 
recently been limited progress in establishing an initial track record of investigation, prosecution 
and final convictions in high-level corruption cases; and in organised crime prosecutions 
involving smuggling of migrants and drug trafficking (EC, 2018e). Such progress is due in large 
part to the greater pro-activeness of the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) (BTI, 2018e; 
Milošević et al., 2018). The SPO and the Anti-Corruption Agency still face various challenges in 
their work, however (EC, 2018e; Vavić et al., 2016). Institutional capacity to ensure freedom of 
expression and media protection remains weak (Vavić et al., 2016).  There are limited 
investigations into cases of violence against journalists, and new cases continue to emerge (EC, 
2018e). This is despite the establishment of the Commission for Monitoring Competent 
Authorities in Investigating Cases of Intimidation and Violence Against Journalists in 2014 
(Milošević et al., 2018). Implementation of the anti-discrimination legislation also remains weak 
(EC, 2018e). The Roma minority are still particularly vulnerable and subject to discrimination, in 
addition to Albanians and Bosniaks in certain parts of the country (BTI, 2018e; EC, 2018e; US 
DOS, 2018e). In the case of asylum, decisions on whether to accept refugees in Montenegro are 
often purely political, with the government deciding whether to accept refugees (Vavić et al., 
2016). 
Serbia 
While Serbia has made progress in the Europeanisation of judicial independence, various 
problems persist. The current reforms encourage separation of powers, but this has not been 
implemented (BTI, 2018f; EC, 2018f; Gome, 2017). While judicial and prosecutorial councils 
have continued to build their capacity, they have yet to fully assume their role due to legislative 
and administrative delays (EC, 2018f).   Political interference with the councils’ appointments and 
promotions continues, with limited progress toward a transparent, merit-based system (BTI, 
2018f; EC, 2018f; Elek et al., 2016; Milošević and Muk, 2016). The Ministry of Justice also holds 
much control over the composition of the academy (Fagan, 2016). The judiciary’s vulnerability to 
influence makes it risky to remove external oversight and to grant the judiciary full independence 
(Fagan and Sircar, 2015). In the absence of an enabling culture and environment, the situation in 
Serbia is considered by some to have worsened with the establishment of a judicial council 
(Bošković, 2015). The current government has failed to design a comprehensive vetting process, 
due in large part to a lack of political will (Maxhuni and Cucchi, 2017).  Judicial efficiency is 
undermined by a large backlog of cases; inadequate levels of competence; a high level of 
bureaucracy and red tape; and unchecked procedural abuses (Gome, 2017; Elek et al., 2016; 
World Bank, 2014). Access to justice is also hindered by high legal fees; lack of an efficient free 
legal aid system; and delays in case processing (EC, 2018f; World Bank, 2014). Corruption and 
organised crime remain serious and widespread problems (EC, 2018f; Ciero, 2016). Serbia has 
established the legal and institutional framework to fight organised crime, corruption, abuse of 
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power and other corrupt practices, including action plans and more recently the introduction of 
whistle-blower protection (BTI, 2018f). Various challenges remain, including: lack of sufficient 
capacities; lack of transparency in decision-making processes; and lack of institutional 
cooperation (Ciero, 2016; McDevitt, 2016). There is a limited track record of investigations, 
indictments and final convictions in corruption cases involving high-level public officials and in 
cases of organised crime (BTI, 2018f; EC, 2018f; McDevitt, 2016).  There have been various 
challenges in carrying out war crimes prosecutions in Serbia, including delays in publishing the 
strategy and in appointing staff; and public statements about trials by the executive (EC, 2018f; 
McDevitt, 2016). There has been backsliding in media freedom and protection, with reports of 
various forms of government pressure and attacks against journalists, with few convictions (EC, 
2018f; Huska, 2018; Marić and Bajić, 2018; US DOS, 2018f; Elek et al., 2016). The Romani 
experience the greatest level of discrimination of any ethnic minority in Serbia (BTI, 2018f; US 
DOS, 2018f; Elek et al., 2016). Other marginalised groups include LGBTI persons, persons with 
disabilities, and victims of gender-based violence. Despite a strong legislative framework and 
corresponding institutions in place to prevent such discrimination, there are inadequate levels of 
staff and substantial knowledge gaps (Marić and Bajić, 2018). While the EU and the EC praised 
Serbia’s performance during the 2015-16 refugee crisis, there are key problems with the asylum 
system. These include: deficient implementation of legal provisions; slow and ineffective asylum 
procedure; lack of human resources; and inadequate knowledge and skills of the existing staff 
(Imeri et al., 2018; Marić and Bajić, 2018).  
  
10 
2. Regional challenges 
Establishing the rule of law remains a key challenge in the Western Balkans. Progress in the 
region, while different across countries, is slow (Mendelski, 2018; Milošević and Muk, 2016). The 
rule of law criterion has emerged as one of the top priorities and key concerns in EU enlargement 
policies for the Western Balkans (Elbasani and Šabić, 2017). The countries in the region are in 
different stages of the EU integration process. Weakness in rule of law is a common obstacle 
towards faster integration (Marović, 2018). The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
show that the largest gap between the Western Balkans and EU member countries lies in the 
rule of law (see Sanfey and Milatovic, 2018). The World Justice Project Rule of Law index (2018) 
also indicates that the Western Balkans experiences weaker rule of law than members of the 
European Union. European Commission progress reports in the areas of rule of law (functioning 
of the judiciary, fight against corruption and fight against economic crime) demonstrates that the 
countries in the Western Balkans operate largely based on (2) some level of preparation. There 
are also some scores of (1) at an early stage and (3) moderately prepared.1 See Table 1. 
Table 1: State of progress in rule of law 
 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia 
Source: EC progress reports; see Sanfey and Milatovic, 2018, 8 
The 2016 Balkan Barometer, a public opinion survey commissioned by the Regional Cooperation 
Council, also reveals poor public perception on rule of law in Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia. On average, more than 71 percent of citizens in the three countries disagree with the 
statement that the law is applied to everyone equally, while 67 percent of them disagree with the 
statement that judicial system is independent from political influence (see Milošević and Muk, 
2016, p. 7). 
Judicial independence 
The rule of law requires an independent judiciary to protect citizens against the arbitrary use of 
power by the state, individuals or any other organisation (Bara and Bara, 2017). Judicial 
independence means that judges act freely and impartially, without political pressures, influences 
and biases, when they are called upon to determine what the law requires.  This also requires 
                                                   
1 The other two levels are: (4) good level of preparation, and (5) well advanced. 
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that judges are appointed without the influence of certain political personalities (Bara and Bara, 
2017; Hajdari et al., 2014). Despite efforts to establish relevant legal frameworks and 
infrastructure, most countries in the Western Balkans still face problems in terms of a lack of 
independence and accountability (Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). Their judicial systems are 
adversely affected by politicisation of the judiciary, undue influences and judicial corruption. This 
undermines the institutions themselves, their ability to hold other institutions accountable, and 
public trust in the judiciary (Anastasi, 2018; Taleski et al., 2016).  
The prevailing view is that curtailing political interference with the judiciary and strengthening the 
competency and independence of judges (most of who will have been appointed and trained 
under the socialist regime) will promote sources of progressive change and prevent corruption 
(Fagan, 2016). Judicial independence and accountability are considered critical to advancing 
impartial justice and increasing public confidence in the judiciary (Anastasi, 2018).  
The establishment of an independent judiciary has been one of the key reform priorities in the EU 
accession processes of the Western Balkan countries (Bobek and Kosar, 2014).  While there has 
been progress in improving the efficiency of the judiciary in the Western Balkans, an extensive 
study on monitoring and evaluating the rule of law in the Western Balkans finds that there is no 
significant progress regarding independence (Milošević and Muk, 2016).  Legal systems continue 
to be influenced by corruption and politicisation. Much of the reforms here have focused on the 
establishment of judicial and prosecutorial councils, academies for judges and prosecutors and 
vetting processes (Memeti, 2014). 
Judicial councils 
Institutional reform has often been limited to promoting one particular model of court 
administration: the judicial council model.  The vast majority of documents of the Council of 
Europe and the European Union claim that the model improves judicial independence; however, 
they do not set out standards of how this should be achieved (Bobek and Kosar, 2014). Judicial 
councils are typically independent bodies, established under law or constitution, which serve as 
intermediary organisations positioned between the judiciary and the politically responsible 
administrators in the executive or the parliament. They are designed to insulate the functions of 
appointment, promotion and discipline of judges from partisan political processes (Takacs, 2018; 
Bobek and Kosar, 2014). The aim is to prevent undue influence of the executive over the 
judiciary from being misused to influence decision-making of the courts and individual judges. 
Judicial councils are also expected to improve the overall performance of judges and promote 
efficient functioning of the judicial system, in terms of court management, budgeting of the courts, 
and equipment and infrastructure modernisation (Takacs, 2018; Bobek and Kosar, 2014).  
Judicial academies 
A key issue in reforming judicial independence in the Western Balkans has been the 
understanding and application of the concept of “independence” amongst judicial practitioners 
(Fagan, 2016). Judicial academies, established in countries in the Western Balkans, are 
designed to improve the quality of judicial education and ultimately to enhance effectiveness, 
efficiency and professionalism of the judiciary (Imeri et al., 2018; Ilievski, 2014). The EU has 
heavily promoted academies as a tool for improving the quality of the judiciary (Fagan, 2016). 
Academies serve as the main entry point for judicial and prosecutorial candidates into the judicial 
system, carrying out initial and ongoing training of such candidates to further pursue their careers 
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in the justice systems. They are expected to contribute to the merit-based recruitment and 
professionalism of judges (Imeri et al., 2018). 
Challenges 
Multiple models: The judicial council Euro-model, which centralises competencies affecting 
almost all matters of the career of judges at one place and grants control over this body to the 
judges, is but one model that exists in Europe (Preshova et al., 2017; Bobek and Kosar, 2014). It 
is thus difficult to claim that it is truly a “best practice” or a genuine “European model” (Preshova 
et al., 2017). There is also a general discrepancy in the practices within the EU which are used to 
foster judicial independence (Preshova, 2018). 
Unintended consequences: Case studies of judicial reform in BiH and Serbia suggest that EU 
rule of law interventions and support in the Western Balkans can inadvertently result in deficient 
independence and the emergence of new channels of political interference (Fagan, 2016). The 
introduction of “strong” judicial councils, such as the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council 
(HJPC) in BiH, and efforts to reform the judiciary more generally, has led to adverse effects when 
carried out prematurely - in the absence of the appropriate legal and judicial culture and mentality 
or a parallel process of transformation of culture (Takacs, 2018; Fagan, 2016; Bobek and Kosar, 
2014). It is unlikely that judges who operated in communist and totalitarian regimes can 
transform rapidly into independent and responsible judicial managers and self-administrative 
bodies (Bobek and Kosar, 2014). New, relatively autonomous bodies tasked with training and 
regulating the activities of judges may unintentionally enable new forms of political manipulation 
and reinforce conservative practices that undermine the reputation of the judiciary (Fagan, 2016). 
Thus, the introduction of judicial councils, judicial academies, and other judicial institutions 
without adequate internal reform (e.g. transformation of culture, political maturity, and clarity on 
appropriate levelling between judiciary and other political branches) has led to corruption and 
clientielism. This has led in turn to the formal constitutional prescription of an independent 
judiciary, but the persistence of dependent judges (Takacs, 2018; Bobek and Kosar, 2014). 
Political influence:  Political affiliation is still a key factor in the selection and dismissal of judges, 
prosecutors and members of the relevant judicial and prosecutorial councils, despite the adoption 
of legislative frameworks for merit-based career systems (Imeri et al., 2018). Individual 
independence of judges has still in certain cases been compromised due to political control of the 
disciplinary procedure of judicial councils, evaluation of their work and dismissal. Growing 
political pressure and existing judicial clientelism has also undermined the transparency of 
judicial councils (Preshova et al., 2017). There are also concerns of political influence over 
judicial academies through the composition of directors, steering councils and/or management 
boards of the academies, as in the case of Albania, Serbia and Macedonia (Imeri et al., 2018). 
Inadequate attention to accountability: An effective system of checks and balances between 
judicial independence and judicial accountability is necessary in order to advance the impartiality 
of the adjudication process and increase public confidence in judges and prosecutors (Taleski et 
al., 2016). However, much less attention has been paid, until very recently, to balancing the 
emphasis on independence with equally strong requirements for public accountability and 
transparency (Anastasi, 2018; Bobek and Kosar, 2014). While judiciaries and judicial councils 
have become more independent from political interference in some countries in the Western 
Balkans, they have also in some cases become less transparent and less accountable (Anastasi, 
2018; Fagan, 2016; Bobek and Kosar, 2014). Without ensuring a balance of power with the 
executive and legislature, and without establishing clear terms on the accountability and liability 
13 
of councils’ members, judges can become too independent, using their new-found power to block 
genuine reform. As such, while efforts to curb political interference are important in the post-
authoritarian period, too much movement toward self-governance of the judiciary and granting 
judges from the socialist period independence, in the absence of judicial accountability, can be 
detrimental. It can enable threats from internal and external actors and perpetuate clientele type 
relations between judges and special interests (Anastasi, 2018; Takacs, 2018; Preshova et al., 
2017; Fagan, 2016). Creating mechanisms for and ensuring judicial accountability has emerged 
as a most pressing issue and has become an aspect in the most recent reforms of the justice 
system in the Western Balkan countries (Anastasi, 2018). It can be difficult, however, to find the 
appropriate balance between independence and accountability (Fagan, 2016). It involves 
continual negotiation between judicial institutions and political elites and, importantly, close 
scrutiny of these institutions over time (Fagan, 2016). 
Professional disincentives: Trainings are not sufficiently linked to advancement in the career or 
promotion of judges. As such, those who have gone through training and those who have not 
often remain on equal footing (Ilievski, 2014). 
Finances: Academies often experience financial difficulties due to inadequate budgetary 
allocations. In Albania and Macedonia, for example, the School of Magistrates and the Judicial 
Academy (respectively) lack adequate resources to cover the expenses of the overall operation 
of the institution (Imeri et al., 2018). 
Judicial efficiency 
The constitutions of the countries of the Western Balkans stipulate that the judiciary must offer 
access to justice (Hoxhai, 2018). Many years of neglect and underinvestment, however, have 
undermined judicial efficiency and access to justice of ordinary citizens in the region (Hoxhaj, 
2018). In most countries in the region, long court delays are common and efforts to reduce the 
time frame have yet to be a policy objective (Hoxhaj, 2018). A common recommendation and 
reform initiative throughout the Western Balkan countries is a reduction in the backlog of cases 
(Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). The overly complex and extended system in courts, resulting in 
higher than necessary operating costs, and poorly equipped and maintained facilities, also 
undermine access to justice and produce long wait times for cases to be completed (Hoxhaj, 
2018). Courts are often far away, forcing citizens to travel long distances as soon as cases move 
to upper courts and tribunals. There is also substantial regional variation between metropolitan 
and rural areas (Hoxhaj, 2018). 
Hoxhaj (2018) recommends that the EU’s rule of law initiative in the Western Balkans incorporate 
an infrastructure development strategy to accelerate the reconstruction of courts and increase 
the capacity and resources of the judiciary. The aim should be to render the judiciary more 
accessible to the public. The initiative should include simplifying court documents and 
procedures, including encouraging the use of appropriate technology to enhance court efficiency 
(Hoxhaj, 2018). Technology can also address the need for better transparency, for example 
through the timely publishing of court decisions (Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). Digital case 
management systems, including audio-visual recording and transcription of court proceedings 
can not only make courts more transparent and easier to access, but also reduce the level of 
corruption and increase public confidence in the judicial process (Hoxhaj, 2018).  The 
establishment of a virtual court that relies on a video link between defendants detained in police 
custody or prison and a court room can also result in time and cost-savings. This is particularly 
relevant in the Western Balkans countries, where budgets are often limited (Hoxhaj, 2018). 
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Corruption and organised crime 
Corruption 
Systemic corruption is a persistent problem in all Western Balkan countries (Čeperković and 
Gaub, 2018; Sanfey and Milatovic, 2018). All six countries are ranked relatively low on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), ranging from Montenegro in 
64th place to Kosovo in 95th out of 176 countries. The latest EC progress reports assessed each 
of the six Western Balkan countries’ fight against corruption as being at “some level of 
preparation” (second lowest point). The Western Balkan average CPI score is 40 (on a scale of 0 
(worst) to 100 (best)), compared with an average of 65 in the EU (See Table 2). The private 
sector also perceives corruption as a major obstacle (Sanfey and Milatovic, 2018, 26). 
Table 2: Corruption Perception Index Score 2016 
 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia 
(see Sanfey and Milatovic, 2018, 26) 
The recent Balkan Barometer (2016) finds that citizens in the Western Balkans perceive 
corruption as widespread and endemic.  It also finds that citizens do not see nor recognize efforts 
of respective governments in fighting corruption, and expect much more to be done (RCC, 2016). 
The majority of the population in Southeastern Europe do not consider that their government 
effectively fights corruption (73 percent), although there is variation across countries (RCC, 2016, 
p. 115). 
Corruption and organised crime are considered a threat to stability and good governance. They 
are significant obstacles to the firm establishment of the rule of law, accountable institutions, 
democratic stability, and economic development in the area (Ciero, 2016). The EU Commission’s 
new enlargement strategy notes that “countries show clear elements of state capture, including 
links with organised crime and corruption at all levels of government and administration, as well 
as a strong entanglement of public and private interests” (EC, 2018). In order to establish a 
functioning rule of law, it is essential to fight corruption and dismantle criminal networks more 
efficiently. 
Politicians are seen as corrupt primarily at the national level in the Western Balkans, but also at 
the local level (RCC, 2016). Curbing overarching politicisation in the region is essential to 
countering corruption effectively. The EU, other international donors, the governments and civil 
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society organisations should thus avoid technicisation of the EU accession efforts (Milošević and 
Muk, 2016). 
Anti-corruption efforts 
While corruption undermines the independence and functioning of the judiciary, and genuine 
reform efforts toward the promotion of rule of law, the lack of independence of the judiciary and 
political influences also undermines adequate processing of corruption cases (Imeri et al., 2018; 
Ungar, 2017; Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). As such, interventions seeking to address judicial 
independence can also contribute to the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. Judicial reforms 
and the fight against corruption are also closely related to fostering changes in legal and judicial 
culture and mentality (Takacs, 2018). 
While the EC has given largely positive assessments concerning the strengthening of legal 
frameworks for tackling corruption in Western Balkan countries, political commitment in the 
region is still lacking (Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). There is a consistently poor track record of 
prosecuting and punishing corruption, particularly among high-level officials. Even when cases 
are investigated, they generally suffer from inadequate investigation, long delays and often end 
in acquittals or with light and inconsistent sentences (Albania, BiH, Montenegro, Serbia) 
(McDevitt, 2016). This contributes greatly to lack of public trust in the public institutions that are 
meant to fight corruption (McDevitt, 2016). In 2016, only Kosovo was seen to have made 
progress in countering corruption (Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). 
An emerging practice aimed at addressing the politicisation of institutions is the establishment of 
a Special Prosecutor’s Office. However, they also suffer from political obstacles and lack of 
administrative capacity (Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). Efforts to tackle corruption within the 
judiciary of Western Balkan countries include raising judicial salaries; and introducing random 
allocation of cases, ethical codes for magistrates, and transparency rules (Mendelski, 2014). 
These reforms have had little impact, however, on the perception of corruption and likely on the 
de facto level of judicial corruption. Codes and rules have not always been enforced in practice 
and new procedures can be circumvented. It is argued that such reforms have not tackled the 
sources of corruption (Mendelski, 2014). 
In addition, in order for anti-corruption efforts to succeed, there needs to be effective cooperation 
between all relevant anti-corruption, judicial and law enforcement bodies. Lack of institutional 
cooperation, however, is a common feature of most of the countries in the Western Balkans. 
Failure to cooperate can result in political isolation which renders such bodies vulnerable to 
undue influence and manipulation, which can undermine their ability to perform their functions 
(McDevitt, 2016). Key problems include institutional overlap in fighting and preventing corruption 
(Kosovo, Serbia), limited cooperation between the prosecution and police (Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia) and regular infighting between key judicial and law enforcement actors 
(Albania, BiH) (McDevitt, 2016).  There is also widespread political interference in the 
appointments, transfers and removal of judges, prosecutors and police and in the decision-
making processes of anti-corruption and judicial bodies (McDevitt, 2016). 
Organised crime 
Organised crime, ranging from trafficking in human beings, drugs and weapons to risk of criminal 
infiltration of the political and economic systems, remains a key problem in the Western Balkans 
(EPSC, 2018).  There have been limited changes in reform strategies to counter organised crime 
over the past decade and a half (Imeri et al., 2018). Despite the presence of strategies and 
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action plans to fight organised crime, various challenges persist. The number of convictions is 
still limited. Moreover, there seem to be strong links between organised crime and politics, which 
has resulted in selective investigation of allegations. Overlapping jurisdictions of local and 
international administration and unclear demarcation of responsibilities has undermined reform 
progress in BiH and Kosovo (Imeri et al., 2018). In general, the fight against organised crime and 
high level corruption is still a work in progress, requiring political will in order to make it a reform 
priority. The absence of a concrete EU model has also allowed for governments to pick and 
choose their own model, which may not necessarily comply with guidelines or lead to changes in 
substance (Imeri et al., 2018).  
The European Political Strategy Centre recommends that organised crime needs to be mapped 
more thoroughly. It also recommends that credible action plans are produced and implemented 
that further develop the law enforcement framework, strengthen the prosecution chain and 
improve data collection (EPSC, 2018). 
War crimes prosecution 
Impunity refers to “a structure or culture in which people who hold positions of power abuse 
human rights and commit crimes or other offences without fear of consequences” (Ungar, 2017, 
p. 7). It is not solely a judicial issue, but a highly political problem that can be embedded in 
cultural practices. Ungar (2017) argues that impunity for the crimes committed during the 
conflicts in the Western Balkans is widespread and ingrained throughout the region. Approaches 
to the prosecution of war criminals, crimes against humanity and genocide in the region is 
considered to be piecemeal, failing to dismantle powerful structures of impunity. This undermines 
efforts to achieve justice, restore rule of law and contribute to reconciliation. 
Failure to address the structures of impunity, through such prosecution, is evident in part in the 
declining number of prosecutions (Ungar, 2017). With the termination of ICTY, the main driver for 
criminal justice in the Western Balkans is gone. It is now solely up to the states themselves to 
continue the prosecutions. Apart from BiH, where some limited progress exists with local 
prosecutions, other countries in the region are falling short in adequately addressing impunity 
through their national court systems (Ungar, 2017). 
There are various factors behind failures to prosecute effectively and to address impunity:  
Lack of political will: All the countries of the Former Yugoslavia have amended their criminal 
legislation to allow for effective investigation and prosecution of war crimes. They have also built 
modern courtrooms with the latest audio/visual technology such that the trials can be recorded; 
improved on security; and raised employees’ salaries. However, even in cases where the justice 
system works relatively well, lack of political support can negatively influence the judicial process 
in these cases (Fouéré, 2018). Many suspected war crime perpetrators remain embedded in 
legal structures that are in charge of detecting and prosecuting war crimes, allowing them to 
exert significant influence on decisions related to the investigation and prosecution; and to take 
part in the deliberate destruction and removal of evidence (Fouéré, 2018).  
Ethno-religious tensions: A large proportion of citizens in countries of the former Yugoslavia 
perceive high-ranking war crimes suspects as heroes (Fouéré, 2018). If communities are sharply 
divided along ethno-political lines, discourse often centres on commemorating “own” victims and 
perceived heroes of war and silencing “own” crimes and the suffering of the “others” (Fischer, 
2016).  
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Politicised media: These views are often reinforced in the media – in print, on television, on the 
Internet, the radio or in other forms.  For example, the media often publicises biographies of war 
crimes suspects, including the difficulties he or she has had to face in life, or interviews with 
close relatives in which they praise the suspect as a good and honest person (Ivanović and 
Soltvedt, 2016). Attempts by authorities to prosecute such individuals can then result in 
resentment among the public and loss of legitimacy on the part of the authorities (Fouéré, 2018). 
There has thus often been neither the will nor courage of leading political structures to process 
war crimes suspects nor to investigate their possible crimes. (Fouéré, 2018).  
Inadequate resources and capacity: All countries of the Former Yugoslavia have faced problems, 
particularly in the early post-conflict years, with shortage of prosecutors. In conflict-affected 
contexts, there are an even smaller number of prosecutors (and support staff) specialising in war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (Fouéré, 2018). Further, general weaknesses with 
the judiciary and other oversight bodies make it difficult for them to fulfil their function in 
guaranteeing the non-recurrence of violations (Ungar, 2017). Nonetheless, it is important to note 
that many members of the War Crimes Investigation Service have demonstrated a high degree 
of efficiency and professionalism when acting according to the requirements of the War Crimes 
Prosecutor (Fouéré, 2018). 
Complexity: More than two decades after the 1990s wars, only a small number of cases have 
been concluded and most relate to mass crimes. It is unlikely that the thousands of other pending 
cases will be dealt with and concluded during the lifetime of the accused, the victims and the 
witnesses (Fischer, 2016). In addition to weaknesses in capacity and political will, the reason for 
these delays stem in large part from the significantly greater complexity of these types of crimes, 
compared to traditional criminal investigations and prosecutions (Fouéré, 2018). In addition, it is 
particularly difficult to collect evidence as crimes were often committed in territories outside the 
jurisdiction of state authorities (Fouéré, 2018). This is due in part to weak regional cooperation 
(Fouéré, 2018; Ungar, 2017). A further key obstacle is the ban on the extradition of states’ 
citizens between countries in the region, thus making it impossible to ensure the presence of 
foreign or dual nationality suspects at trial (Fouéré, 2018). 
Victim compensation: The work of the courts has yet to be complemented by programmes that 
provide compensation for the victims, despite the fact that their right to such compensation is 
entrenched in international law (Fischer, 2016). 
Since the end of the conflicts in the Western Balkans, donors have relied on the ICTY as a key 
mechanism to promote change. Ungar (2017) emphasises, however, that the court has clear 
limitations in terms of dealing specifically with individual criminal responsibility, rather than with 
changes in ideologies. The EU accession process provides an opportunity to reframe 
discussions around justice, to re-evaluate the meaning of reform and how it can be more 
effective in fighting impunity. 
Media freedom and protection 
Given the absence of strong horizontal accountability in countries in the Western Balkans, it is 
even more critical that non-state actors, such as the media, have the capacity and the freedom to 
act as an impartial watchdog and to hold political actors to account (McDevitt, 2016). There is a 
continuous trend of stagnation or backsliding in fundamental rights in the Western Balkans, 
however, which has been reflected especially in deteriorating media freedom in recent years. 
This is characterised by political interference; corrupt ties between officials and media owners; 
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tight government control; non-transparent public funding of media and financing of pro-
government media; and a prevailing atmosphere of fear, intimidation of journalists, censorship or 
self-censorship (Imera et al., 2018; Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016; McDevitt, 2016; Milošević and 
Muk, 2016). A range of international actors, such as the EC, OSCE/ODIHR, Reporters without 
borders and the Freedom House, have confirmed this downward trend in media freedom (Imera 
et al., 2018).  According to Freedom House’s 2016 “Freedom of the Press” ranking, the countries 
of the Western Balkans represent six of the nine worst performers for press freedom in Europe 
(see McDevitt, 2016).  
One of the key problems with media independence in the region is the long-term financial 
sustainability of the public broadcaster and political appointments on the editorial board. This 
undermines attempts to promote a diverse and plural media platform (Imera et al., 2018). The 
lack of transparency of media ownership is also problematic, contributing to an environment in 
which journalists do not feel safe to report on particular perspectives (Imera et al., 2018). 
Attacks on journalists, in the form of killings, kidnappings and missing persons, persist 
throughout the region and have increased in recent years (Imeri et al, 2018). In Albania and 
Kosovo, journalists have been continually targeted because of their efforts to expose widespread 
official corruption and organised crime affiliation in their countries. In addition, such attacks do 
not receive adequate judicial follow up due in large part to lack of political will and accountability 
for ineffective investigations. In the case of BiH, there is also an inadequate legal framework; the 
criminal law does not treat attacks against journalists as a criminal offence (Imera et al., 2018). 
Minority protection 
Due to the presence of large diaspora groups in the Western Balkans, there are small pockets of 
minorities among neighbouring countries’ majorities. Serbia, for example, has a large minority 
concentration in the autonomous region of Vojvodina and small groups of ethnic Albanians in the 
south (Tubbs-Herring, 2014). The EU has advocated for stronger rights of minorities, such as in 
the case of political representation, access to education, and voting rights.  Legislative 
frameworks, strategies and action plans for protection against discrimination have been adopted 
across the region, stemming from EU conditionality (Imeri et al., 2018).  
There has been weak implementation of legal frameworks, however, due to lack of institutional 
capacities; poor understanding of the issues at hand and how the law is supposed to be 
implemented; and absence of political will on the part of the various bodies and institutions 
responsible for the protection of human rights and minorities (Imeri et al., 2018; Imeri and 
Ivanovska, 2016). Most politicians in the Western Balkans ideologically oppose the idea of 
integrating minorities into mainstream civil society, resulting in limited progress with minority 
protection, rights and integration (Tubbs-Herring, 2014).  In Macedonia, non-professional staff 
with no experience were elected through a non-transparent procedure to the Commission for 
Prevention and Protection Against Discrimination in 2016, thus calling into question the 
independence of the Commission. Some members have been public supporters of Government 
policies that preclude the equal treatment of ethnic minorities in the country (Imeri et al., 2018). In 
Albania and BiH, the governments lack political will to independently establish minority rights or 
infrastructures. In Serbia, there is political will, however, civil society has opposed such reforms 
to integrate minority groups, making it difficult for the policies and the agencies to be effective 
(Tubbs-Herring, 2014). 
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Imeri and Ivanovska (2016) find that the wording adopted by the EC on several occasions does 
not adequately reflect the severity of the shortcomings regarding minority protection, particularly 
in terms of the persistent discrimination against the Romani community and the hostility shown 
towards the LGBTI community. 
In Albania, discriminatory practices apply to ethnic and religious minorities such as the Romani 
people, who face severe discrimination in education, health care, employment, and housing in 
Albania (Imeri et al., 2018). BiH adopted amendments to the Law on Protection Against 
Discrimination in 2016, which included age, sexual orientation, gender identity and disability as 
grounds for discrimination. In Kosovo, the Law on Protection Against Discrimination lacks legal 
harmonization with other laws and, in general, there is insufficient protection from discrimination 
in practice. This is due in part to many inconsistencies, contradictions, and misinterpretations of 
the law. (Imeri et al., 2018; Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). In Macedonia, legislation has omitted 
“sexual orientation” as grounds for discrimination. In addition, there are very few resolved cases 
confirming discrimination and still no effective protection against discrimination when it comes to 
marginalized groups. In Serbia, although anti-discrimination legislation is in place, there are 
inconsistencies between anti-discrimination laws or ambiguities that require further judicial 
interpretation or legal amendments. In addition, anti-discrimination knowledge of prosecutors and 
judges has still not reached the desirable level (Imeri et al., 2018; Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016).  
There is a need for better implementation of the protection of vulnerable groups and a 
comprehensive approach towards the inclusion of national minorities. Strategies and legislation 
relating to the rights of women and minorities must be carried out and enforced.  There also a 
need for higher sanctions for discriminatory acts (Imeri et al., 2018; Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). 
Data on discrimination cases registered with official institutions, across the region, is scarce and 
non-systematized, which hinders a quantitative overview of the situation in the field. There are 
growing numbers of discrimination cases on the basis of sexual orientation, but these figures are 
not indicative of the reality due to the high number of unreported cases. There is a general lack 
of trust in the institutions and a fear of negative consequences for the victims (Imeri et al., 2018).  
In terms of gender discrimination, Ungar (2017) argues that a meaningful gender approach after 
conflict is necessary in the Western Balkan that goes beyond viewing women solely as victims of 
rape. Such an approach should look at the role of criminal justice in contributing to changing 
engrained structures of marginalisation and discrimination. 
Asylum framework 
Given the unprecedented emergency situation along the Eastern Mediterranean-Western 
Balkans route in 2015-16, special attention has been paid to asylum and immigration policies 
throughout the region. The EU has confirmed the significance of the issue in the new 
Enlargement Strategy (Imeri et al., 2018). Thousands of people have been trapped in Western 
Balkan countries that lack the capacity to provide functioning asylum systems (Imeri and 
Ivanovska, 2016). The human resources and capacities of reception centres have yet to be 
increased, in order to adequately respond to the demands of asylum seekers (Imeri et al., 2018). 
Given the complex nature of the necessary reforms, however, establishing an effective migration 
framework is recognised as a long term process (Imeri and Ivanovska, 2016). 
Cooperation and efforts to address the refugee crisis did not bring about advances regarding rule 
of law. Instead, numerous studies have highlighted the detrimental impact the crisis has had on 
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rule of law in the region. Most Western Balkan countries still face important structural 
shortcomings in all branches, characterised by failure to practically implement fundamental rights 
in key areas, and continued weaknesses in the rule of law (Imeri et al, 2018). Given the 
unpredictability of the issue and the fact that the EU itself does not have a clear plan and solution 
for proper regulation and implementation of asylum policies, Western Balkan countries tend to 
replicate the confusing attitude of EU member states. This leaves them poorly prepared to 
address the needs of asylum seekers (Imeri et al, 2018).  Problems with the implementation of 
asylum law, as in the case of Macedonia and Serbia, include the right to submit an asylum 
request; processing and delivering decisions on asylum claims, which are often undermined by 
discretion in providing explanations for the reasons for rejecting a claim (Imeri et al., 2018). 
The MIPEX assessment (Migrant Integration Policy Index) is an effective instrument to assess 
already implemented and ongoing migration and refugee policies in the Western Balkans. The 
region has recorded the poorest levels of integration in the fields of political participation and 
education (see Stančetić, 2018). 
Factors affecting rule of law reforms 
The absence of the rule of law in the Western Balkans is reflected in weak and heavily politicised 
judicial systems; lack of accountability and transparency at all levels; weak separation of powers; 
insufficient judicial capacity; presence of corruption; and low quality of legislation (Marović, 2018; 
Mendelski, 2018). Scholars claim that the differential impact of the EU in Central and Eastern 
Europe – and the varied development in the rule of law – can be explained in part by structural 
conditions, such as historical legacies, judicial culture, lack of domestic capacity, the power 
balance between change agents and ‘veto players’; and the reform strategy of donors 
(Mendelski, 2018). 
Structural preconditions 
Historical legacies, such as the legacies of communist judicial culture and civil war, play a role in 
the degree of compliance with judicial reform and entrenchment of the rule of law (Mendelski, 
2018; Čavalić and Gajić, 2017; Preshova et al., 2017). Western Balkan countries historically did 
not have much experience with political entities that provided sufficient rule of law. While these  
countries adopted legislation in line with other European countries, subsequent to the Ottoman 
empire, its implementation was weak (Čavalić and Gajić, 2017). In addition, lustration laws in the 
Western Balkans were adopted only by Albania (2008) and Macedonia (2012). This has resulted 
in the persistence of former communist officials from regimes accused of massive human rights 
violations in high offices, undermining rule of law initiatives (Čavalić and Gajić, 2017). 
Politicisation 
Evidence from the most recent round of the EBRD/World Bank Life in Transition Survey 
highlights the pervasive belief in the region that political connections are important to success in 
life (Sanfey and Milatovic, 2018).   
The politicisation and instrumentalisation of laws, reforms and public institutions, such as newly 
created anti-corruption agencies, judicial councils, specialised courts, and other horizontal 
accountability institutions, are critical challenges in the Western Balkans. These institutions lack 
transparency and professionalization and are often captured by reformist change agents or 
reform-resisting veto players (Mendelski, 2018; Mendelski, 2016). Change agents in countries 
with weak rule of law often lack the appropriate incentives, norms and skills to carry out reforms 
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in a non-politicised manner. Mendelski (2016) finds evidence that while attention is paid to veto 
players as obstacles, many of the EU’s reformist change agents from the Western Balkans can 
also be obstructionist. They have (mis)used the law and the judicial/prosecutorial structures as a 
weapon against their political and economic competitors, rather than respecting the rule of law. 
Civil society organisations should identify genuine change agents of reforms in the region in 
order to hold them up as role models and to promote peer pressure among the countries 
(Milošević and Muk, 2016). 
Political will 
A key challenge to the establishment of the rule of law is the failure of current political elites in 
the Western Balkans to commit to the implementation of democratic principles and rule of law 
standards (Milošević and Muk, 2016). An assessment of EU benchmarking mechanisms in the 
region demonstrates that political will is crucial for the success of planned reforms and for the 
prosecution of high-level corruption, war crimes and institutionalised crime (EPSC, 2018; Imeri et 
al., 2018). However, political will is often lacking in the region, resulting in limited progress. In 
Macedonia and Montenegro, for example, special prosecutions, while demonstrating a degree of 
independence, face intense political pressures and obstructions from other institutions (Milošević 
and Muk, 2016).  Also in Montenegro, a completely new legal framework (prepared with 
extensive assistance from EU experts) and institutional capacity building (e.g. the Judicial 
Training Centre and the Judicial and Prosecutorial Council) have not yet guaranteed merit-based 
recruitment and promotion – indicating the presence of undermining political influences (Imeri et 
al., 2018). In Serbia, political elites have vested interests in maintaining the status quo and 
keeping a hold on the judiciary (Imeri et al., 2018).  
Localisation 
Reforms can both consolidate and undermine the rule of law (Mendelski, 2016). Memeti (2014) 
finds that rule of law promoters tend to see rule of law as an institutional checklist focusing 
primarily in the judiciary, often equating rule of law with judicial reform (e.g. establishment of 
judicial councils, capacity building for judges, case management). 
Much of the literature emphasises the need to develop specific approaches for each country. 
However, international donors, including the EU, often insist on transplanting their particular “best 
standards” laws and model, which may not work sufficiently well under domestic conditions 
(Mendelski, 2018; Mendelski, 2016).  Preshova et al. (2017) emphasise that the “European 
model” is based on assumptions and preconditions related to a legal and judicial culture and 
mentality that were/are not yet present in the Western Balkan countries. Thus, the limited 
success of the model can be attributed to the premature establishment of initiatives, such as the 
establishment of judicial councils, in the absence of the necessary accompanying judicial culture. 
A further challenge of transplanting a “European” model is that there is an absence of a unified 
approach among EU member countries, themselves, for example in preserving judicial 
independence (Preshova et al., 2017). 
Fundamental vs Technical 
Progress on rule of law in the Western Balkans has generally been more technical rather than 
directly focusing on politically sensitive issues. Financial assistance has been directed toward 
technical capacities, including attention to better infrastructure, improved payment schemes, 
clear institutional procedures, and training (Elbasani, 2018). While judicial capacity in the region 
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has increased to some extent, judicial impartiality has not. On the one hand, international donors 
were able to modernize the judicial system by redesigning the legal framework, increasing 
judicial salaries, providing computerization and training, and creating and strengthening judicial 
bodies and agencies. On the other hand, in Serbia, for example, too many hasty legal changes 
and the politicised manner of conducting reforms have contributed to declines in overall 
efficiency and impartiality (Mendelski, 2014). As discussed, curbing overarching politicisation in 
the region, in particular progress regarding independence, is a key precondition for the 
establishment of rule of law (Milošević and Muk, 2016) and for greater success in internationally-
led campaigns (Elbasani, 2018).  Scholars advocate for a “fundamentals first” approach, with 
better attention to impartiality, independence, separation of institutions, and more efficient 
inclusion of civil society (Elbasani, 2018; Šabić, 2018; Milošević and Muk, 2016). 
Quality vs Quantity 
A key identified problem with the EU’s rule of law reforms is its quantitative approach, which 
follows a “the more the better” mindset in assessing rule of law (Mendelski, 2016). Quantitative 
outcomes (e.g. more laws, resources, convictions, arrests etc.) have taken precedence over 
qualitative reform processes and procedures (i.e. how laws, arrests or convictions are made) and 
efficiency-related outputs (e.g. absence of backlogs) (Mendelski, 2016; Mendelski, 2014).  
Mendelski (2016) advocates that EU conditionality should shift its focus form quantitative 
outcomes and indicators towards qualitative processes and indicators. This could contribute to a 
greater impact on the ground (Mendelski, 2014). The World Justice Project has attempted to fill 
this void by providing indicators to assess the quality of laws (Mendelski, 2018). 
Adverse consequences 
Quantitative and technical approaches can not only limit impact on the ground, but also create 
perverse incentives and superficial outcomes. For example, the demand for shorter case 
proceedings could result in superficially adjudicated cases. Further, calling for judicial 
independence, without attention to judicial accountability, can create a powerful and 
unaccountable judiciary that blocks reforms (Mendelski, 2014). Mendelski (2018) finds that EU-
driven rule of law reforms often contribute to a considerable increase of judicial capacity and 
substantive legality, but have adverse consequences on judicial impartiality and formal legality. 
Similarly, Fagan (2016) concludes that EU interventions can result in deficient independence 
along with the emergence of new channels of political interference. 
Reforms can thus both consolidate and undermine the rule of law.  Determining factors are the 
quality of the reform process, which depends on the underlying conditions in the target country. 
Reformers often reproduce the respective social order in which they are embedded (Mendelski, 
2018). For example, while judicial councils and anti-corruption agencies have worked relatively 
well in established democracies in the Baltic states, increasing judicial independence and 
oversight, they became unaccountable and non-transparent bodies in Southeastern Europe, 
subject to political influence. This in turn undermined the rule of law (Mendelski, 2018). 
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3. Albania 
Judicial independence 
There is little respect for the rule of law and its implementation on the part of the political elite in 
Albania (Mavrikos-Adamou, 2014). Key obstacles include difficulties in establishing an 
independent judiciary and the pervasiveness of corruption (Mavrikos-Adamou, 2014).  
The Albanian Constitution sets out the principles of judicial independence and impartiality.  
Ongoing justice reform in Albania aims for a total reformation of the judicial system and the 
functioning of the courts in Albania, including the Constitutional Court, placing important criteria 
on the selection of judges and law clerks, in order to ensure judicial independence (Bara and 
Bara, 2017). 
Progress reports of the EU Commission for Albania find, however, that the functioning of the 
judicial system continues to be affected by a high degree of political influence. Albanian political 
leaders have often assumed open political affiliations in their nomination of key posts within the 
judiciary, resulting in the presence of party cronies in the judicial hierarchy (Elbasani, 2018; 
Elbasani and Šabić, 2017). The lack of a functional, independent role for the judiciary, along with 
leader-dominated political parties, undermines the process of institutional checks and balances. 
There are inadequate degrees of transparency in the appointment and promotion of judges, 
insufficient oversight mechanisms to ensure the integrity of the judiciary, and questionable 
independence and impartiality of the High Court (see Anastasi, 2018; McDevitt, 2016; Mavrikos-
Adamou, 2014).  The position of the Prosecutor General is of particular concern, being appointed 
by proposal of the president and only simple majority consent in parliament (McDevitt, 2016). 
Reforms in Albania have given prosecutors greater autonomy and reduced the centrality of the 
Prosecutor General. None of the criminal cases against serving government officials in Albania 
have resulted in convictions, with the High Court and the prosecution blaming each other for the 
failures (McDevitt, 2016).  
According to the 2017 Balkan Barometer, 49 percent of the respondents disagree that judiciary 
institutions are independent of political influence, while only 3 percent agree that they are 
independent (see Mitrushi, 2018, p. 8). 
Judicial and prosecutorial councils 
The latest EC report recommends that Albania should advance the implementation of justice 
reform by completing the set-up of the new judicial structures – the High Council of Justice 
(HCJ), the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC), the High Justice Inspector and the Justice 
Appointment Council (EC, 2018a). The High Council of Justice has been unable to operate 
effectively and has failed to promote professionalism. The institution will be replaced with the 
High Council of the Judiciary, which will be comprised of six judges and five non-judges. It will be 
in charge of the election of Supreme Court members, the annual evaluation of judges, career 
promotion, disciplinary measures, finance management etc. (Xhepa, 2018). 
The Prosecutorial Council, which oversees the work of prosecutors, is a formal and weak 
structure, unable to keep a check on the Prosecutor General’s power over prosecutors’ careers 
and discipline. As a result, almost 80 percent of prosecutors believe that the current appointment 
formula for the Prosecutor General lacks guarantees of independence and should be changed 
(McDevitt, 2016).   
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Judicial academy 
Since its creation in 1997, the Albanian School of Magistrates has been responsible for the 
education and ongoing professional training of judges and prosecutors in the judicial system; and 
changes in the recruitment of judges and prosecutors.  However, inadequate budgetary 
allocations and training resources continue to be a challenge (Mitrushi, 2018; Fagan and Sircar, 
2015). Justice reform has also yet to effectively establish the merit-based career system for 
judge’s benchmark, with appointment and promotion of judges often based on political influence 
(Mitrushi, 2018). Moreover, the law that established the School of Magistrates raises concerns 
about political influence through the composition of the Steering Council of the School and the 
appointment procedure of the School’s Director (Mitrushi, 2018; Fagan and Sircar, 2015).  
Professional Judges’ Associations have also been established and supported, by USAID, in 
order to strengthen the judiciary and foster its independence. An early challenge involved the 
association of existing judicial associations with a single individual, suggesting that the 
organisations were nothing more than a reflection of the two main political parties (USAID, 2015). 
An assessment of USAID’s first year of support for judges’ associations finds that only one of 
these organisations, the Union of Albanian Judges (UAJ), had the basic organisational 
foundation to become a viable voice of the judiciary (USAID, 2015). The UAJ is considered to be 
a success story though, with marked growth in members (through cluster groups and awareness 
campaigns), amounting to more than half of the judiciary in Albania. Greater membership has 
meant more revenues from dues, allowing the organisation to sustain itself from its own budget 
(USAID, 2015). 
Vetting 
As part of Albania’s EU- and US-led “reform package”, the Albanian Assembly adopted the law 
“On the Re-Evaluation of Judges and Prosecutors in Albania”, commonly known as the “vetting 
law”. It is considered an important part of reforms, designed to root out the high level of 
corruption in the judiciary; to ensure judicial independence; and to restore public trust in the 
judiciary (Xhepa, 2018). The process of re-evaluating all judges and prosecutors has since 
begun (EC, 2018a; US DOS 2018a). There are controversies and concerns in the political arena, 
however, that public officials in the executive branch could use the new rules to influence judicial 
reappointments (Anastasi, 2018; Maxhuni and Cucchi, 2017).  
In addition, the vetting process should not be viewed as an institutional asset that will be 
sufficient to eliminate corruption from the judicial system. Vetting cannot be a stand-alone 
measure. More comprehensive measures are needed to eliminate political interference and 
establish operational independence and public accountability in the judiciary (EC, 2018a; 
Maxhuni and Cucchi, 2017). Further, in order to renew public trust in the Albanian judiciary, there 
should be transparency and consultation, such that the public can understand and shape the 
process and have confidence in the reform (Maxhuni and Cucchi, 2017). 
While the EC (2018a) has lauded the first tangible results of implementation of the vetting law 
with the resignation of members of the judiciary, Xhepa (2018) finds that these vetting processes 
can also have adverse consequences. The vetting process was delayed in Albania due to 
constitutional challenges, whereby the law was ultimately upheld (BTI, 2018a).  These delays 
and the vetting process, itself, have impeded the establishment of numerous institutions and 
other processes of judicial reform. In the case of the Constitutional Court, for example, the re-
evaluation of judges found that seven out of nine proved to be inadequate to be part of the 
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judiciary, essentially rendering the Court unable to function. This in turn allows for possible 
violations of the Constitution and a threat to rule of law (Xhepa, 2018). The vetting process also 
caused problems in the constitution of the Justice Appointments Council, HCJ, HPC, the court 
and special prosecution unit for combating corruption and organised crime. Xhepa (2018) 
recommends that all possible candidates who want to be elected in these institutions should 
previously be vetted. 
Judicial efficiency 
Court management in Albania remains poor. There are inadequate human and material 
resources in first-instance district courts, long delays in conducting judicial proceedings, a high 
backlog of cases, all of which further weaken the judicial system (Mavrikos-Adamou, 2014). 
The EC recommends in its latest report that the allocation of cases should be conducted 
randomly by lot and through electronic means (EC, 2018a). The electronic case management 
system has weaknesses, however, affecting its proper functioning. Prosecution offices often fail 
to make full use of the system and to produce reliable data. The system needs to be integrated 
with other relevant databases. Concerns over overall length of court proceedings and the 
execution of court decisions also remain (EC, 2018a). Court delay is a primary cause of public 
dissatisfaction, undermining confidence in the judiciary (USAID, 2015). The USAID Rule of Law 
programme was intended to assist courts in meeting standards for performance, accountability 
and transparency. It targeted Albania’s two largest and most crowded urban courts, encouraging 
them to improve court management, courtroom usage and the efficiency of court operations. 
Software programmes helped to optimise available courtrooms (USAID, 2015; Mavrikos-
Adamou, 2014). 
Lack of transparency in the judicial system in Albania also weakens public confidence in the 
courts (USAID, 2015). The failure of judges to publish their decisions or to articulate the basis for 
decisions undermines the fairness of court proceedings. USAID assistance to Albania consisted 
of strategies to improve due process, in terms of establishing a reviewable record, transparency 
and openness. This can be promoted through digital audio recording technology, conducting of 
trials in public courtrooms, and the application of modern management principles to the 
processing of cases – all of which can promote more accurate trial records, greater transparency 
and public trust in the judiciary. Courtrooms in Albania now contain sustainable state-of-the-art 
digital recording technology to provide a verbatim record (USAID, 2015). In addition, attention to 
cutting down on the number of non-productive hearings and reducing court delay have improved 
the efficiency of court proceedings (USAID, 2015).  
Access to justice 
A UNDP survey on access to justice in Albania finds that the need for justice in the country is 
largely unmet. Almost half of the population has had legal problems, which have largely gone 
unresolved due to a lack of legal awareness and the underperformance of justice sector 
institutions (Milatovic, 2017). This is particularly true for members of disadvantaged groups, 
including the poor, lesser educated, the Romani, members of the LGBTI community, and victims 
of widespread discrimination (Milatovic, 2017). 
Corruption and organised crime 
Corruption 
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High levels of corruption is pervasive in all branches of government, representing a critical 
challenge in Albania that requires constant measures (Mitrushi, 2018; US DOS, 2017a).  
Corruption undermines the independence and functioning of the judiciary in Albania, which has 
also affected public trust toward it (BTI, 2018a; Xhepa, 2018; Mavrikos-Adamou, 2014). Judges 
are often susceptible to bribery and, at the same time, have immunity against investigations of 
their alleged abuses of power (Mavrikos-Adamou, 2014). The media has reported on various 
cases of corruption including judges demanding payment or sexual favours for their decisions, 
the release of criminals with excessive criminal records, and the doctoring of incriminating 
evidence against political leaders (BTI, 2018a). Albanians have also suffered from long delays 
and unfair decisions, stemming from a corrupt judiciary (BTI, 2018a).  
Anti-corruption efforts 
International and EU authorities have continuously urged Albania to intensify the fight against 
corruption (Mitrushi, 2018). The country has made some progress, notably with the amendments 
to the criminal code and adoption of a legal framework to counter corruption (EC, 2018a).  It is 
also in the process of establishing a chain of specialised anti-corruption bodies in charge of 
investigating, prosecuting and sanctioning corruption, including a special prosecutor’s office (EC, 
2018a). Another important novelty of judicial reform in Albania is the constitution of the Special 
Anti-corruption Unit and the Anti-corruption Investigation Bureau. They will be composed of 
national and international prosecutors, and will undertake the fight against corruption by high 
level state officials (Xhepa, 2018). 
While the law provides criminal penalties for corruption by public officials, the government has 
not implemented the law effectively, and officials have frequently engaged in corrupt practices 
with impunity (US DOS, 2018a). Corruption and abuses of public office are rarely investigated, 
particularly when it comes to high-level politicians and public officials (BTI, 2018a; Elbasani and 
Šabić, 2017; McDevitt, 2016). This is due to investigators’ fear of retribution; a general lack of 
resources; investigative leaks; real and perceived political pressure; and corruption within the 
judiciary itself (US DOS, 2018a).   Police involvement in corruption is also an obstacle to in-depth 
investigations of corruption cases (Mitrushi, 2018). Prosecutors recently announced, however, an 
investigation of a former interior minister for ties to abuse of office and organised crime (US 
DOS, 2018a).  
Politicians who are accused of corruption and abuse of office are usually not prosecuted. 
Instead, they are released at various stages of judiciary proceedings, despite substantial 
evidence of guilt (BTI, 2018a; McDevitt, 2016). Where high-level officials have been convicted, 
they have mostly been part of the judiciary (judges and prosecutors) (EC, 2018a). 
Organised crime 
Albania has made some progress with organised crime, notably in the fight against cannabis 
cultivation (EC, 2018a). In addition, amendments to the anti-mafia law and the Criminal 
Procedure Code have created the conditions for increased efficiency of criminal investigations. 
Albania participated successfully in international police cooperation, increasing collaboration with 
EU Member States. There has, however, been little progress in dismantling organised criminal 
groups. The number of final convictions in organised crime cases remained very low, with only a 
marginal increase. Greater efforts are needed to tackle money laundering, criminal assets and 
unjustified wealth (EC, 2018a). 
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Media freedom and protection 
Independent media in Albania is active and able to express a wide variety of viewpoints (US 
DOS, 2018a). There are various constraints that media faces, however, including political 
pressure, corruption, resource constraints and financial shortfalls, and threats and violence 
against journalists. This has contributed to the practice of self-censorship and bias in reporting 
(Mitrushi, 2018; US DOS, 2018a). While police protection is sometimes provided to journalists 
and investigations are initiated, there are no indications of any prosecutions or convictions. There 
are also records of hostile statements against journalists by politicians. Politicisation of the 
regulatory institution (the Audio-Visual Media Authority) and the public broadcaster is also an 
indication of government control of the media in Albania (McDevitt, 2016). 
Minority protection 
There have been allegations of discrimination in Albania against members of the Romani and 
Balkan-Egyptian communities, including in housing, employment, health care, and education.  
Some schools resisted accepting Romani and Balkan-Egyptian students, particularly if they 
appeared to be poor.  Many mixed schools that accepted Romani students marginalized them in 
the classroom, in some cases keeping them apart from other students (US DOS, 2018a). In 
addition, Romani rights NGOs criticized the Tirana municipal government for delaying the 
building of new homes for Romani families removed from their homes in 2016 (US DOS, 2018a).  
The government has recently adopted new legislation on minorities, which provides official 
minority status for nine national minorities (Greeks, Macedonians, Aromanians (Vlachs), Roma, 
Balkan-Egyptians, Montenegrins, Bosnians, Serbs, and Bulgarians) without distinguishing 
between national and ethnolinguistic groups. The new legislation provides minority language 
education and dual official language use for local administrative units in which minorities 
traditionally reside, or in which a minority makes up 20 percent of the total population (US DOS, 
2018a). 
Asylum framework 
Algerians, Syrians, and Libyans have entered Albania in recent years, many of whom have 
requested asylum. The law on asylum requires authorities to grant or deny asylum within 51 days 
of an applicant’s initial request.  There have been credible reports from NGOs, migrants and 
asylum seekers, however, that authorities did not follow due process obligations for some asylum 
seekers and that in other cases those seeking asylum did not have access to the system.  The 
UNHCR has also been critical of the government’s migrant screening and detention procedures; 
and reported that the asylum system lacked effective monitoring (US DOS, 2018a). 
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Judicial independence 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has made some progress regarding the judiciary. The country has a 
stringent legal framework to ensure independence of the judiciary and prosecutors, appointed 
and regulated by the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) formed in 2006 (Hrasnica 
and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018). Reforms have generally been implemented at a slow pace, 
however, and there are continuing concerns about political interference in the judiciary, 
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particularly in the case of judicial appointments, transfers and removals (Hrasnica and Ramić-
Mesihović, 2018; McDevitt, 2016; Fagan and Sircar, 2015).  In addition, there are numerous 
instances of unwarranted political interference in the day-to-day operation and decision-making 
processes of judicial and anti-corruption bodies, including the executive making public threats to 
officials in prosecutors’ offices to alter their decisions (McDevitt, 2016). Political interference and 
lack of independence of the judiciary have been particularly problematic in cases of war crimes 
processing (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018).  
Trust of citizens in BiH in the work of judges and prosecutors is very low. Citizens believe that 
corruption and political influence on judges and prosecutors are the biggest problems, for which 
they blame the government and poor internal organization of the justice system (Hrasnica and 
Ramić-Mesihović, 2018).  
Judicial and prosecutorial councils 
The establishment of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council has been the key focus of EU 
assistance in the area of judicial reform. The HJPC is an independent state-level body, with wide-
ranging competences across courts and prosecutors’ offices across all levels of governance in 
BiH, including the appointment and promotion of all judges and prosecutors; disciplinary 
proceedings; determining training; and proposing judicial budgets (Fagan, 2016). The current 
composition of 15 members of the HJPC are selected from judges and prosecutors from the 
state, entity, and district levels (Fagan, 2016). 
The politicisation of the appointment and recruitment procedures for the HJPC members and 
Chief Prosecutors at all levels are problematic. The election of the president of the Council in 
2014, despite media reports of ties to organised crime, is one such example (McDevitt, 2016). 
Further, some political parties have suggested an increase in executive and legislative influence 
in appointing HJPC members (Fagan and Sircar, 2015).  
In addition to undue influence from external actors, there are problems with the internal operation 
of the Council. There are concerns that the Council operates without transparency and that 
ethnic interests or factions impede their work (Fagan 2016). Fagan (2016) argues that the 
internal workings of the Council (i.e. how various factions are balanced and managed) is as 
important to ensuring its independence as preventing interference from the executive, legislature 
or other political interests (Fagan, 2016).   
Vetting 
Vetting measures had a mild effect in BiH, increasing the transparency and accountability of the 
judicial system and partly restoring public confidence in the judiciary (Maxhuni and Cucchi, 
2017). There were various challenges throughout the process, including lack of clarity over the 
evaluation criteria. Lack of transparency and accountability of institutions in BiH have made it 
difficult to assess the criteria of moral integrity, technical skills, qualifications, property and 
financial status, and war crimes record (Maxhuni and Cucchi, 2017). 
Judicial efficiency 
There is consensus that inadequate attention has been given to strengthening of prosecutorial 
capacities and working conditions for prosecutors in BiH.  The length of court proceedings has 
decreased in recent years, albeit minimally (EC, 2018b).  An evaluation of the Improving Judicial 
Efficiency Project (JEP), commissioned by the Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo, finds that the 
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project contributed to improved efficiency of the judiciary, primarily through the reduction of case 
backlog. With JEP-funding, the HJPC instituted backlog reduction plans against which individual 
judges and court performance are monitored. This has also contributed to making the courts 
more accountable (Trivunovic and Devine, 2015). Despite these improvements, case backlog 
remains a persistent obstacle in prosecutor’s offices (EC, 2018b; Milošević and Muk, 2016). At 
the end of 2016, there was still a backlog of over two million unresolved civil cases in BiH and no 
effective mechanism to enforce court orders (BTI, 2018b, p. 14).  
Reforms have also yet to adequately improve the judicial budget, training for judges and 
prosecutors, and capacities of the judiciary (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018; Fagan and 
Sircar, 2015). Training is provided by the Judicial and Prosecutorial Training Centres (JPTCs) of 
the two Entities, operational from 2003 (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018). Inadequate 
infrastructure and equipment conditions of courts and prosecutors’ offices, including lack of 
available space and inadequate facilities for juvenile and victims, undermine the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the judicial and prosecutorial institutions. This concerns security aspects, access 
for disabled persons, services to citizens, and support to victims/witnesses and media 
representatives.  Equal access to justice is also severely undermined by the fragmentation, 
politicisation and inefficiency of the judicial system (BTI, 2018b).  
Corruption and organised crime 
Corruption 
Despite some progress in fighting corruption in BiH, it remains widespread (EC, 2017b). 
Corruption represents a very significant threat to the country’s long-term stability and rule of law 
(OSCE, 2018). 
A public opinion survey carried out by USAID revealed that citizen satisfaction with the 
independence of the judiciary, its efficiency, and its ability to fight corruption, process war crimes 
cases, and protect labour rights remained low. Another survey focusing on actual experiences of 
corruption affecting the daily lives of ordinary people documents that 8 out of 10 Bosnian citizens 
have to deal with corruption in the course of the year. This occurs mainly at the local (municipal 
and cantonal) level, where most contacts between public administrators and citizens occur. It 
also occurs in both urban and rural areas (Belloni and Strazzari, 2014). 
Anti-corruption efforts 
Although preventative measures remain important in BiH, the criminal justice system serves as 
the main instrument for countering corruption. However, national and international observers 
generally perceive that the judicial response to corruption is far from satisfactory (OSCE, 2018). 
Although the legal framework is in place, the number of officials convicted of abuse of office and 
corruption in BiH is minimal. According to the EU, the investigation of public officeholders 
remained rare and there were no final convictions in any high-level corruption case in 2016, 
despite frequent media reports on alleged systematic abuses of office (BTI, 2018b). Where 
investigations were launched against middle-ranking or high-ranking officials, they dragged on for 
years, ending in acquittals (McDevitt, 2016). There is no adequate sentencing practice for 
corruption cases. In many of the monitored cases that ended in conviction, there was a marked 
leniency in sentencing, with prescribed punishments often falling below the mandatory statutory 
minimum (OSCE, 2018; McDevitt, 2016). Corruption proceedings often result in pardons for 
defendants, while the remaining cases result in parole or fines (Belloni and Strazzari, 2014). The 
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poor track record in punishing corruption, particularly among high-level officials, is the key reason 
for the lack of public trust in institutions, their integrity and any commitment to fighting corruption 
(McDevitt, 2016). 
Jurisprudence on corruption-related offenses is not harmonized, and judicial bodies adjudicating 
these cases fail to refer to precedents in their reasoning. Judicial decisions are often based upon 
unclear reasoning (OSCE, 2018). Trial monitoring reveals examples of unclear or inconsistent 
interpretation of substantive and procedural law in BiH. There is thus a high risk of individuals 
receiving different judgements in similar cases (OSCE, 2018). 
Organised crime 
BiH has made some progress in tackling organised crime, notably by adopting a new strategy on 
fighting organised crime and suppression and fulfilling the action plan on anti-money laundering 
and financing of terrorism (EC, 2018b). The largest number of organised crime groups in BiH is 
engaged in illegal drug trade and human trafficking (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018).  
Cooperation with EU member states resulted in the success of some large scale convictions for 
organised crime (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018). 
Obstacles to the efficient countering of organised crime are lack of technical and administrative 
capacities, in particular with regard to financial investigations and countering terrorism; 
communication with international partners; slow processing of cases within the judiciary; lack of 
coordination of law enforcement agencies; and inadequate cooperation with neighbouring 
countries (EC, 2018b; Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018).  
War crimes prosecution 
BiH adopted the National Strategy for War Crimes Prosecution and has continued to implement 
the national war crimes strategy objectives (EC, 2018b). This includes the transfer of less 
complex cases by the state-level judiciary to other judicial levels and the state-level judiciary 
taking over the most complex cases from other jurisdictions. It also includes the ongoing tackling 
of the backlog of war crimes cases, including the successful prosecution of war crimes cases 
involving sexual violence (EC, 2018b). There have been weaknesses in implementation, 
however (Ungar, 2017). While the number of indictments filed and confirmed have increased, 
they relate primarily to low-level direct perpetrators of the crimes, rather than high-level 
perpetrators, who were leaders or held command responsibility (Korner, 2016). The backlog of 
cases is likely to remain high, given the working practices of the Court of Prosecutor’s Office and 
the focus on trials of low-level perpetrators, which involve time and resources that could instead 
be allocated toward more complex cases (Korner, 2016). 
Further, attempts have been made by politicians in the RS to undermine the work of the state-
level court. In addition, issues connected with the application of the new criminal code have led 
to retrials that have had a negative impact on the perception of the judiciary in BiH (Ungar, 2017). 
While in-court victim and witness support was further improved with authorisation of the courts’ 
police to ensure protection, its long-term sustainability is linked to the continued guarantee of 
domestic financing (EC, 2018b). Problems with witness protection remain wide-ranging and 
complex (Korner, 2016). Also, given the long time period that has elapsed since the start of the 
conflict, witnesses and potential accused have died, emigrated or suffered from memory loss. 
Available witnesses may have had to make numerous statements to different authorities and 
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testify before different courts, which increases the possibility of inconsistencies that the defence 
may exploit to discredit them (Korner, 2016). 
Media freedom and protection 
Most media outlets in BiH are dependent on and controlled by the ruling elite and powerful 
oligarchies. Government institutions remain the biggest advertisers and use this to pressurise 
media outlets to adopt editorial policies that promote their interests. This is particularly evident 
during election campaigns. The few media outlets that are critical of the government are instead 
frequently subjected to intimidation and threats, impromptu investigations and fiscal and tax 
controls, and physical violence from politicians or criminal groups (McDevitt, 2016). According to 
data collected by the Journalists Association of BiH, 217 media houses, institutions and 
association have been attacked since 2013 (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018, 16). 
Even when media outlets are successful in exposing a high-level corruption case, they generally 
receive a very limited response from law enforcement and judicial institutions (McDevitt, 2016). 
Authorities do not collect data on threats and attacks against journalists and media workers (EC, 
2018b).  Such threats and attacks do not receive adequate follow up by relevant police and 
judicial authorities; swift investigations and prosecution of perpetrators is not ensured (EC, 
2018b; Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018). The authorities either fail to investigate the cases 
or do so only once the person involved has fallen from power (McDevitt, 2016). Further, criminal 
law in BiH does not treat threats and attacks against journalists as a criminal offence (Hrasnica 
and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018).   
Minority protection 
BiH has an established legal framework for protection of minorities. Amendments to the Law on 
Prohibition of Discrimination were adopted in 2016 which included age, sexual orientation, 
gender identity and disability as grounds for discrimination (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 
2018; US DOS, 2018b).  In addition, the Federation of BiH added hate crimes provisions to its 
criminal code (similar provisions were already in place in the RS and Brčko District) (BTI, 2018b). 
BiH Council of Ministers have also since made the first report on Discrimination Instances 
followed by recommendations for the decision-making and other bodies for prevention. In 
addition, state and entity-level parliaments had national minority councils that met on a regular 
basis, but lacked the resources and political influence to affect decision-making processes (US 
DOS, 2018b). 
Members of minorities continue to experience harassment and discrimination in employment and 
education, in the government and private sectors; property rights to returnees; access to 
housing; and the right to health and social protection (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018; US 
DOS, 2018b).  A significant percentage of Romani people, for example, were homeless or 
without water or electricity in their homes (US DOS, 2018b). While the number of attacks against 
religious objects has decreased, there is a general increase in the number of discrimination 
cases on the basis of ethnic belonging and sexual orientation. LGBTI persons faced frequent 
violence, harassment and discrimination, including termination of employment (US DOS, 2018b). 
Discrimination also takes place on the basis of disabled persons, gender, returnees to areas 
where their constituent peoples are in the minority. Multiple discrimination is evident on the basis 
of women with disabilities, women from rural areas, Roma women, etc. (Hrasnica and Ramić-
Mesihović, 2018). 
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Human rights activists have frequently complained that authorities do not adequately enforce the 
legal framework to protect minorities from discrimination (US DOS, 2018b). In addition, they find 
widespread indifference by law enforcement and government authorities toward Romani victims 
of domestic violence and human trafficking (US DOS, 2018b). There are also concerns that there 
are still a large number of unreported cases of discrimination, due to a general lack of trust in 
institutions and fear on the part of victims of negative consequences.  In addition, some 
vulnerable groups (e.g. Romani and LGBTI) are hesitant to rely on the Law due to the 
inaccessibility of the legal system (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018).  
Discrimination in politics is also an issue in BiH. Persons who do not belong to any of the three 
main ethnic groups continue to be excluded from the right to compete for key public offices, 
despite a 2009 European Court of Human Rights ruling that requires the country to remove this 
restriction from its constitution (BTI, 2018b). Women also continue to be underrepresented in 
politics and even more so in the economic sphere, despite legislation on equal rights for men and 
women being largely in place. Further, legislation on the prevention of and protection from 
gender-based violence is inadequate and implementation remains poor (BTI, 2018b). 
Asylum framework 
The asylum and international protection system in BiH is largely in line with EU and international 
standards (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018). Given the refugee crisis, BiH adopted the 
Strategy and Action Plan on Migrations and Asylum 2016-2020, which refers to the need to 
strengthen reception capacity in the country and increase regional and international cooperation. 
Various departments and legal and security bodies, across the entities and Brcko District, signed 
a memorandum in 2016 on cooperation and coordination of activities in the case of a migrant crisis 
in BiH (Hrasnica and Ramić-Mesihović, 2018). 
5. Kosovo 
Judicial independence 
Legal safeguards on independence and impartiality are enshrined in Kosovo’s Constitution and 
legal framework (EC, 2018c).  While progress has been achieved in implementing the 2015 
justice package laws in Kosovo, its judicial system remains at an early stage. The UN mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) has the aim of establishing a multi-ethnic, transparency in judiciary. Kosovo has 
yet, however, to have a fully functional judiciary (Hajdari et al., 2014). The recruitment and 
integration of Kosovo Serb judges and prosecutors and their support staff across Kosovo into the 
judicial system was a big achievement in 2017 (BTI, 2018c; EC, 2018c).  
The independence of the judiciary continues to be undermined, nonetheless, by undue political 
influence and high levels of corruption (BTI, 2018c; EC, 2018b). In addition, witness protection is 
inadequate and the administration of justice remains slow and inefficient (EC, 2018b). The 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and its Kosovan counterparts have 
made some progress in terms of sustainability, accountability, and multi-ethnicity of institutions, 
including compliance with European best practices and international standards (BTI, 2018c). 
Rule of law institutions require sustained efforts to build up their capacities (BTI, 2018c; EC, 
2018b).   
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Public perception towards judicial independence continues to be low among the population in 
Kosovo. Around 60 percent of those that were surveyed think that the justice system did not 
improve in the last years (Rexha, 2018, 10).  This could be explained in part by the lack of final 
verdicts in cases where high profile politicians are being investigated (Rexha, 2018). 
The EULEX mission, which has been the costliest and the most ambitious mission undertaken by 
the EU, has also been one of the most criticised missions. Critics argue that it delivered only 
mediocre outcomes, operating with a top-down approach, which left the “everyday” space 
unaffected by reforms; and advancing short-term goals by empowering illiberal actors (Dursun-
Özkanca, 2018). EULEX’s approach of offering assistance has been unable to counter the 
tendency of Kosovo elites to obstruct reform to protect their own particularistic or criminal 
interests (Radin, 2014). 
Judicial and prosecutorial councils 
The laws on the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) and Kosovo Prosecutorial Council (KPC) were 
amended in June 2015 in order to give both institutions greater discretion in drafting and 
proposing their budgets to the Kosovo Assembly. In addition, the budget allocated to both 
councils was recently increased (EC, 2018c). There have also been efforts to increase 
transparency by making meetings of both councils open to the media and the public; and 
publishing annual reports online. Improvements to the reporting mechanisms are still required 
(EC, 2018c). Moreover, a constitutional amendment to the KJC requires that seven of the 13 
members be appointed by judges and six by the National assembly (instead of four by judiciary 
and nine by the assembly). This gives the judiciary a more prominent role in appointing members 
to the judicial council. In addition, four members should be from minorities (BTI, 2018c; McDevitt, 
2016).  This change in composition should strengthen judicial independence (BTI, 2018c). 
Nonetheless, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2018 finds that the KJC and 
KPC have thus far failed to protect judges and prosecutors from external influence (BTI, 2018c). 
The EC (2018c) recommends that the two councils establish a mechanism to react more 
efficiently and actively in cases of alleged political interference in the judiciary. 
Vetting 
The legal basis for the vetting process in Kosovo was adopted in 2006, based on the process 
followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (Anastasi, 2018). The aim is to establish an independent 
and professional judiciary and prosecution service to administer the judicial system in a 
professional and transparent manner, thus improving public confidence in the judiciary (Maxhuni 
and Cucchi, 2017). The vetting process has faced a number of concerns, caused in large part by 
political influence, specifically during the process of (re)appointment of judges and prosecutors 
(Anastasi, 2018; Fagan and Sircar, 2015). The President of Kosovo interfered, for example, with 
a number of candidates being removed from the judicial council list without explanation (Fagan 
and Sircar, 2015).  
Maxhuni and Cucchi (2017) offers instead a positive assessment of the vetting process, with re-
evaluation of judges and prosecutors carried out under the supervision of the EU Commission 
Liaison Office. Nonetheless, the continued lack of judicial independence, lack of efficiency and 
high level of corruption are clear indicators that the vetting process has not had lasting effects in 
the judiciary of Kosovo (Maxhuni and Cucchi, 2017). 
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Judicial efficiency 
Administration of justice in Kosovo is slow and inefficient. Courts are burdened with a large 
backlog of pending cases at court level (BTI, 2018c). Kosovo needs to become more efficient in 
dealing with the backlog of cases (EC, 2018c). There is an ongoing risk that courts are unable to 
dedicate the necessary attention to high-profile and serious cases, alongside the high number of 
incoming minor offence cases (EC, 2018c). Kosovo is working on the implementation of the 
2014-2019 strategic plan for its judiciary and a strategy for reducing the backlog of cases (BTI, 
2018c). 
Judicial efficiency is constrained by lack of physical, technical and financial resources. EULEX 
judges caution that the local judiciary was insufficiently prepared to manage complex and 
sensitive lawsuits (BTI, 2018c). There are also severe shortcomings in criminal legislation (BTI, 
2018c; EC, 2018c). A centralized criminal records registry is still missing (BTI, 2018c); and many 
provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code are too cumbersome and formalistic to allow for 
robust and successful investigation and prosecution. In addition, the low capacity and 
commitment of some judges to manage court proceedings; to sanction the parties causing 
delays; and to ensure the  presence  of  all  parties  at  sessions results in numerous  
postponements  of  hearings  and significantly protracted criminal proceedings (EC, 2018c). 
These delays in proceedings, in combination with the preference for detention over other 
restrictive measures, have resulted in cases of overly long detention (EC, 2018c). 
Corruption and organised crime 
Corruption 
Corruption remains a serious and widespread problem in many areas of Kosovo’s political and 
administrative life (BTI, 2018c; EC, 2018c). Kosovo is at an early stage in the fight against 
corruption; it continues to implement the 2013-2017 anti-corruption strategy and action plan, 
monitored by the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) (BTI, 2018c; EC, 2018c). Progress has been 
achieved in various areas, including: compliance of criminal law provisions on corruption with 
European standards; creation of a multi-disciplinary investigating team and introduction of a 
tracking mechanism for high-profile corruption, which could lead to asset seizure and 
confiscation (BTI, 2018c; EC, 2018c). There has been some preliminary confiscation of assets, 
although final confiscations remain low (BTI, 2018c; EC, 2018c). 
Anti-corruption efforts 
Concerted and comprehensive efforts are needed to effectively tackle corruption (EC, 2018c). 
Anti-corruption, judicial and law enforcement bodies must work closely together to be effective 
(McDevitt, 2016).   
Despite the existence of an anti-corruption legal framework and various efforts to tackle the 
problem, there are still minimal concrete results (Roxcan, 2018). Enforcement of anti-corruption 
measures and effective financial investigations still lag due to inadequate financing, limited 
capacity, and attempts to influence the proceedings (BTI, 2018c). The Kosovo Anti-corruption 
Agency and the Office of the Auditor General share responsibility for combating government 
corruption. Institutional overlap in anti-corruption efforts can cause confusion among citizens, 
involving multiple institutions (e.g. President’s Anti-Corruption Council, ACA, the Anti-Corruption 
Task Force in the Special Prosecution’s Office, networks of prosecutors coordinating corruption, 
35 
and EULEX). Further, failure of institutional cooperation, common in Kosovo and other countries 
in the Western Balkans, can lead to political isolation, which makes such bodies more 
susceptible to manipulation and less able to perform their functions (McDevitt, 2016). Some 
scholars argue that corruption and organised crime worsened under EULEX’s tenure, 
contributing to perceptions of lack of legitimacy and accountability of the mission (Dursun-
Özkanca, 2018). 
While some progress has been made in the track record on the investigation and prosecution for 
high level corruption and organised crime cases, including final convictions, problems remain 
(EC, 2018c). Indictments are poorly written and not well investigated or presented, making it 
difficult for judges to make informed and well-reasoned decisions (McDevitt, 2016). Moreover, 
local judges and prosecutors are often reluctant to take on cases dealing with high-level 
corruption and organised crime, due to fear stemming from physical threats ad losses of their 
jobs (Dursun-Özkanca, 2018). Even where corruption is investigated and charged, convictions 
are minimal (US DOS, 2018c). There is thus a poor track record in terms of punishing corruption, 
particularly among high-level officials, resulting in a lack of public trust in institutions, their 
integrity and commitment to fight corruption (McDevitt, 2016). 
Organised crime 
Kosovo is also at an early stage in the fight against organised crime (EC, 2018b). While there is 
more preliminary confiscation of assets, there are still few final convictions, financial 
investigations and final confiscations of assets (EC, 2018b; Roxcan, 2018). In particular, the 
number of complex organised crime cases to result in final verdicts is low; and there are issues 
with inter-institutional cooperation among rule of law actors and information exchange (Roxcan, 
2018). The EU has pushed for greater progress in tackling organised crime, more specifically: for 
the establishment of a tracking mechanism not only for high-profile cases, but for all criminal 
cases; and for more effective efforts to fight money laundering (EC, 2018b; Roxcan, 2018). 
War crimes prosecution 
While the war crimes department within Kosovo's Special Prosecution Office continues its work, 
challenges persist. The Office's workload has increased significantly due to the downsizing and 
handover of EULEX cases to local prosecutors (EC, 2018c). As of summer 2018, the task of 
prosecuting war criminals was left entirely to local prosecutors, who do not have the capacity yet 
to deal with the issue (Ungar, 2018). There is a pressing need for greater training, staff and 
translation capacity (EC, 2018c).  There is a backlog of war crimes case files, due to the low 
number of prosecutors working on war crimes and inadequate cooperation between Kosovo’s 
and Serbia’s prosecution offices, particularly over the exchange of evidence and extradition 
(Ungar, 2018; EC, 2018c).  
There are also significant concerns about the willingness to investigate, prosecute and judge war 
crimes cases involving former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members (EC, 2018c). UNMIK and 
EULEX often prioritised investigations into crimes committed by Serbian forces, but these cases 
rarely ended up in court due to the lack of cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia (Unger, 
2018).  There is currently significant opposition to prosecuting KLA members from former KLA 
members who have now become senior politicians. This plays out in the form of witness and 
victim intimidation (Unger, 2018). 
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While progress was made with regard to prosecutions for sexual violence in the ICTY, including 
landmark verdicts on sexual violence in armed conflict, and by local courts in BiH, only a handful 
of prosecutions for wartime rape have been completed in Kosovo (Unger, 2018). 
Media freedom and protection 
One of the key problems with media independence in Kosovo is the long-term financial 
sustainability of media outlets (Roxcan, 2018; US DOS, 2018c).  Growing financial difficulties of 
media outlets have the potential to undermine the editorial independence of media outlets. Those 
that are self-sufficient often adopt policies independent of political and business interests; 
however, those with few resources may accept financial support in exchange for particular 
coverage in line with the funders’ interests (US DOS, 2018c).  
The EC (2018c) reports that the number of threats and attacks against journalists has increased, 
resulting in journalists feeling unsafe with regard to reporting perspectives (see also US DOS, 
2017c). Key challenges regarding the protection of journalists are the lack of thorough 
investigations by the justice system in relation to physical attacks; and the low efficiency of the 
courts giving final verdicts in relation to those cases (Roxcan, 2018). While investigations have 
been opened in many reported cases, investigations are slow and convictions minimal (EC, 
2018c). There needs to be a more systematic response, including prompt investigation and 
timely judgements, in addition to a mentality of zero tolerance for threats or attacks against 
media (EC, 2018c). 
Minority protection 
Ethnic minorities (e.g. the Serb, Romani, Ashkali, Egyptian, Turkish, Bosniak, Gorani, Croat, and 
Montenegrin communities) have experienced varying levels of institutional and societal 
discrimination in employment, education, social services, language use, freedom of movement, 
the right of displaced persons to return to their homes, and other basic rights (US DOS, 2018c). 
According to NGO reports, the LGBTI community has also faced overt discrimination in 
employment, housing, determination of statelessness, and access to education and health care 
(US DOS, 2018c). 
Minorities also experience discrimination in the judicial system (BTI, 2018c). Access to justice for 
non-Albanian communities, particularly for Kosovo Serbs and displaced persons, remain a 
concern. Access and the proper delivery of justice is constrained by poor or no translation in 
court proceedings, inconsistency between Albanian and Serbian translations of legislation, and 
limited numbers of non-Albanian staff (US DOS, 2018c). 
Asylum framework 
EC reports underlined that training of staff in regards to their capacity to assess asylum applications 
needs to be ongoing in order for the law to be fully implemented (Roxcan, 2018). 
6. Macedonia 
Judicial independence 
Reports of political intervention and influence in judicial decisions are common in Macedonia, 
severely undermining the independence of the judiciary (McDevitt, 2016; Taleski et al., 2016).  
37 
The government adopted the 2017-2022 Judicial Reform Strategy and a corresponding action 
plan. The independence of the judiciary is formally guaranteed by the country’s legal framework, 
which is aligned with EU standards on judicial independence. The system has gradually been 
strengthened in practice, with the establishment of self-elected judicial and public prosecutors’ 
councils that appoint and dismiss judges and prosecutors and the Academy for Judges and 
Prosecutors (BTI, 2018d; Preshova, 2018; Jordanova and Dimovska, 2016).  
Despite the fact that the structural preconditions for independence are in place, reforms have not 
been substantially implemented, and the functional independence of the judiciary has 
deteriorated. There continues to be political pressures and interference in the work of the 
judiciary (BTI, 2018d; Priebe report, 2017; Preshova et al., 2017; Jordanova, and Dimovska, 
2016; Fagan and Sircar, 2015).  
A series of wiretapped conversations, which emerged in late 2015, revealed that the executive 
has complete control over the judiciary, resulting in an atmosphere of pressure and insecurity 
within the judiciary (Priebe report, 2017; Priebe report, 2015).  Specifically, the director of the 
security service and the first cousin of the prime minister kept a list of eligible candidates for 
judges and issued orders regarding the career advancement system and the election of 
members to the Judicial Council and the Council of Public Prosecutors (McDevitt, 2016; 
Mendelski, 2016; Taleski et al., 2016).  This scandal adversely influenced public perceptions of 
the judiciary (Taleski et al., 2016). 
Criminal responsibility for the illegal wiretaps is essential (Priebe report, 2017). Prosecutions 
arising from the scandal appear, however, to be selective – and have related exclusively to the 
acts of making, obtaining, releasing and publishing the interceptions, rather than to  the  many  
potentially  criminal  or  otherwise  illegal  acts  revealed  in  their content (Priebe report, 2015).  
A special public prosecutor office was set up due to the public prosecutor’s failure to investigate 
the wiretapped materials (BTI, 2018d). This office has been impeded in its work, however. While 
it has submitted several charges, the court has been very slow to process them (BTI, 2018d). 
Other indications of political interference in the judiciary include the allocation of sensitive files to 
particular judges whose decisions favour the political establishment, rather than following the 
system of random allocation using an automated system (Priebe report, 2017). A number of 
judges have also reported that some judges who had failed to act as demanded by political 
elements were transferred to a different type of work, given very little work to do or overloaded 
with an unmanageable level of cases. These practices correspond with the very high rate of 
dismissals from the judiciary in the country over the last decade (Priebe report, 2017). 
The judiciary is constrained not only by the lack of independence or budget, but also by the lack 
of trust among citizens. Studies have demonstrated a deep mistrust in the judiciary and its 
various institutions (Taleski et al., 2016). Respondents considered the independence of the 
judiciary to be on the decline, due primarily to the presence of political interference (Taleski et al., 
2016). There is also widespread perception among ethnic Albanians that the delivery of justice is 
selective and that accountability of the judiciary is weak (BTI, 2018d; Taleski et al., 2016).  This 
harms the trust that is placed on judicial institutions (Taleski et al., 2016). 
Judicial and prosecutorial councils 
The Judicial Council’s primary role is that of ensuring and guaranteeing the independence and 
the autonomy of the judiciary. Its functions include the appointment, evaluation, promotion, 
discipline and dismissal of all judges (Priebe report, 2017). The Council has 15 members, eight 
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of whom are elected by the judges themselves. Appointments and promotions should be made 
by the Judicial Council and the Council of Public Prosecutors according to transparent, objective 
and strictly merit-based criteria and based on transparent procedures established by law (Priebe 
report, 2015).  
In Macedonia, however, judicial and prosecutorial councils have functioned as a long arm of the 
political parties with little transparency (Milošević and Muk, 2016; Fagan and Sircar, 2015). The 
appointment of judges and court presidents by the Council has been made without any prior 
changes to the election system (Jordanova and Dimovska, 2016). Politically motivated 
appointments and promotions were regularly used by the ruling parties for extending their 
influence in the judiciary (Preshova et al., 2017; Fagan and Sircar, 2015). The control and 
misuse of the judicial system by a small number of judges in powerful positions, in order to 
promote their own political interests, has continued. These judges pressurise more junior 
colleagues through their control over the systems of appointment, evaluation, promotion, 
discipline, and dismissal, which have been used as rewards and punishments (Priebe report, 
2017). 
Further, the way in which the Council evaluates and disciplines judges serves to undermine 
rather than to guarantee their independence and autonomy (Priebe report, 2017). The European 
Court of Human Rights has found that the Council’s practices in regard to disciplinary 
proceedings have infringed human rights, yet the Council has not taken steps to remedy the 
breach (Priebe report, 2017). The Council also fails to provide specific reasons for dismissals 
and is less inclined to adopt other measures short of removal (Fagan and Sircar, 2015). In 
addition, it failed to ensure proper supervision of the system of random assignment of cases 
(Priebe report, 2017). 
The case of the Judicial Council in Macedonia demonstrates that the judiciary was not ready for 
such a high level of self-government. It was introduced amidst the existence of strong ties with 
the past judicial mentality and culture. In the absence of a genuine tradition of judicial 
independence in the country, the introduction of the Council could not lead to a positive outcome 
(Preshova, 2018; Preshova et al., 2017). The insulation of the judiciary from the other branches 
of state power through the Council, has not strengthened independence and accountability, but 
rather has had the adverse consequence of exposing the judiciary even further to undue political 
pressure from the executive and ruling party elites (Preshova, 2018; Preshova et al., 2017; 
Jordanova and Dimovska, 2016; Taleski et al., 2016). A recent analysis finds that there is a very 
low level of trust in the work of the Judicial Council and the Council of Public Prosecutors. 
Respondents have given a very low score for the functioning of the two councils, in large part 
due to political influences. Trust of the Judicial Council is particularly low among the Albanian 
population, which also undermines the legitimacy of the courts (Taleski et al., 2016). 
The EU has set out a list of “urgent reform priorities” that Macedonia needs to implement to avoid 
further backsliding (see Preshova et al., 2017). After the change of Government in June 2017 
(and change in political climate), there has been a slight change in the direction of respecting 
merit-based principles in the procedure for selection of presidents of the courts and higher courts 
judges (Imeri and Ivanovska, 2018). Later that year, the Judicial Council selected, for the first 
time, candidates based on the criteria for promotion of judges stipulated in the Law on Judicial 
Council (Imeri and Ivanovska, 2018). 
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Judicial efficiency 
The efficiency of the judiciary in Macedonia has improved. Case backlogs have not been an 
issue for several years (Centre for legal research and analysis, 2016).  Transparency of the 
judiciary remains an issue, however, requiring further improvements. While transparency has 
improved with the publication of decisions on the courts’ website, there needs to be greater 
outreach by the courts (Taleski et al., 2016).  
The World Bank and USAID have funded projects in Macedonia in order to increase the 
efficiency of the judiciary. The objective of the World Bank’s Legal and Judicial Implementation 
and Institutional Support Project (LJIIS) was to contribute to improving judicial efficiency by 
enhancing judicial capacity and infrastructure; and supporting the Judicial Council in 
implementing efficient  processes  for  monitoring  and  evaluating judicial performance (Centre 
for legal research and analysis., 2016). The main focus of USAID funded projects in the judiciary 
was also on increasing the efficiency of the judiciary, by improving the case management 
systems, infrastructure of the courts, and ICT and court staff capacities (Centre for legal research 
and analysis, 2016). 
Corruption and organised crime 
Corruption  
The law in Macedonia provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials. However, there were 
reports that officials engaged in corruption with impunity (US DOS, 2018d). Corruption remains 
prevalent, with little concrete results in practice (BTI, 2018d). There is a strong perception among 
the population in Macedonia that the judiciary is corrupt (BTI, 2018d). NGOs find that the 
government’s dominant role in the economy created opportunities for corruption (US DOS, 
2017d). According to Transparency International’s annual 2016 Global Corruption Barometer, 12 
percent of survey respondents reported having to pay bribes to obtain public services to which 
they were legally entitled.  In addition, all respondents believed powerful, influential, and rich 
individuals exerted too strong an influence over politics (US DOS, 2018d, p. 23). Corruption also 
varies along ethnic lines. A study finds that 83.3 percent of ethnic Albanians reportedly 
experienced pressure to pay a bribe and 80.5 percent paying a bribe, compared with 40.6 
percent and 35.5 percent, respectively, of ethnic Macedonian respondents (US DOS, 2018d, 23). 
Anti-corruption 
Measures to fight corruption have ultimately had no pronounced impact, as indicated by the 
country’s persistently low standing in the Transparency International Corruption Perception and 
other relevant indices.  
A key achievement in anti-corruption efforts in Macedonia is the establishment and the operation 
of the Special Public Prosecutor. Despite systematic and organised obstruction by Government 
institutions and courts, such as withholding approval of the team requested by the Special 
Prosecutor, the Office has continued investigations (EPI, 2017; Milošević and Muk, 2016). The 
track record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions is strong on offences committed by 
low-level officials but remains weak on high-level corruption (Priebe report, 2017). The legal 
framework for the prosecution of abuse of office is largely in place; however, the relevant 
institutions lack the necessary resources (BTI, 2018d). There is a need for greater capacities and 
improvement in horizontal cooperation amount anti-corruption, judicial and law enforcement 
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bodies (BTI, 2018d; McDevitt, 2016). In Macedonia, however, cooperation among the judiciary, 
the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (SCPC) and the Prosecution Office for 
Organised Crime and Corruption is consistently found to be weak or non-existent, rending these 
bodies less effective and susceptible to manipulation (McDevitt, 2016). The passiveness and 
failure of the competent institutions, including the SCPC, to react to the wiretapping scandal is a 
significant step backwards in the area of anti-corruption (Jordanova and Dimovska, 2016). The 
new anti-corruption programme (2016-2019) of the SCPC does not include any planned actions 
that address the problems from the wiretapping scandal (Jordanova and Dimovska, 2016). 
Organised corruption 
The main role in the fight against organised crime now belongs to the Special Public Prosecutor 
(Jordanova and Dimovska, 2016). The failure of the judiciary to respond to major abuses of high-
ranking officials, indicating the existence of organised crime, supports the view of backsliding in 
efforts to tackle organised crime and corruption (Jordanova and Dimovska, 2016). 
Media freedom and protection 
The media in Macedonia continues to face many of the same challenges that have influenced the 
media landscape for the past several years (Priebe report, 2017). The perception remains that 
media outlets are politically affiliated or instruments of influential persons (Priebe report, 2017). 
Freedom House reports that political influence from both the ruling parties and the opposition 
characterise the media landscape. The media regulator, AAVMS, is also seen to be neither 
politically or financially independent (McDevitt, 2016). Media outlets are also divided along 
political and ethnic lines (Priebe report, 2017). 
Investigative journalism is obstructed by authorities, which hinders citizen’s access to reliable 
pluralist and objective information. Journalism is curtailed due to fear, lack of resources and 
journalistic skills (Priebe report, 2017). While intimidations, threats  and  violence  against  
journalists  are  reported,  there is a climate of impunity, with failure of the authorities  to   
investigate,  charge  or  convict  the  perpetrators (Priebe report, 2017).  More recently with the 
improved political climate, however, there has been a decrease in pressure on journalists. The 
government concluded an agreement with an association of journalists to conduct follow-up 
investigations on attacks against them in December 2017. Registration of attacks on journalists 
remains inadequate, however, with few investigations being launched (EC, 2018d). 
Minority protection 
Some vulnerable groups in Macedonia are frequently subject to discrimination and the denial of 
basic liberties. Selective application of established laws by authorities are particularly harmful to 
the Romani and the poor (BTI, 2018d). They are reports of unequal access of the Romani to 
employment, public services and benefits (US DOS, 2018d). 
Ethnic minorities, with the exception of Serbs and Vlachs, reported widespread societal 
discrimination. They are significantly underrepresented in the civil service and other state 
institutions, including the police and courts (US DOS, 2018d). Ethnic Albanians continued to 
critique unequal representation in government ministries and public enterprises (US DOS, 
2018d). 
The constitution and law prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  
However, the LGBTI community remains marginalised. Members of LGBTI groups and activists 
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advocating for their rights are often targets of physical violence, harassment, and derogatory 
language, including from journalists and official political representatives (BTI, 2018d; US DOS, 
2018d). There is also a failure of police to arrest perpetrators of attacks, and failure of the 
government to condemn discrimination against the LGBTI community (US DOS, 2018d). 
Asylum framework 
Macedonia’s Law on Asylum for granting asylum or refugee status is largely harmonized with the 
EU. It was put to the test in 2015 with large migration flows, although most asylum seekers were 
only passing through the country (Imeri et al., 2018). The UNHCR reported, however, that the 
mechanism for adjudicating refugee status failed to provide basic procedural guarantees and 
proper determinations as prescribed in the law (see US DOS, 2018d). The UNHCR found 
specifically that asylum seekers from countries with active conflicts, such as Libya and Yemen, 
were reportedly denied entry, in violation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Protocol 4 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (US DOS, 2018d). 
7.  Montenegro 
Judicial independence 
The key objectives of the Judicial Reform Strategy 2014-2018 include strengthening the 
independence, impartiality and accountability of the judiciary. The latest amendments to the 
constitution, adopted in 2013, followed by the adoption of a new legal framework in 2015, have 
strengthened the independence of the judiciary (McDevitt, 2016). Despite the adoption of a legal 
framework and the establishment of new institutions, however, significant changes in judicial 
practice have yet to happen (BTI, 2018e).  
Attempted political interference, including by authorities internal to the judiciary, remains a key 
issue of concern (EC, 2018e). The remuneration of judges, prosecutors and administration needs 
to be increased in order to match the weight and duties of the judicial function. This is a 
precondition for independence and autonomy in their work (BTI, 2018e). A stronger political 
commitment is needed to ensure the full independence of Montenegro’s justice system (EC, 
2018e). 
Judicial and prosecutorial councils 
Judicial reforms in Montenegro include the introduction of the principle of the immovability of 
judges and limits on political influence on the process of appointment of judges (McDevitt, 2016). 
The capacities of the judicial and prosecutorial councils have improved, indicated by the 
recruitment of judges and prosecutors under the new system and implementation of the new IT 
strategy (EC, 2018e). Recruitment, professional appraisal and the promotion system of judges 
has yet to be fully implemented, however. In addition, a track record of disciplinary responsibility 
is still lacking (EC, 2018e). Issues remain regarding the appointment and promotion of judges 
and state prosecutors, transparency in relation to the appraisal system, criminal liability and 
disciplinary and ethical responsibility, as well as the rationalization of the judicial network (Vavić 
et al., 2016). The capacity of the new Prosecutorial Council has improved, but still lacks 
transparency and strategic planning for budget and human resources (BTI, 2018e). 
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According to public perceptions, almost half of citizens do not trust the independence of the 
judiciary or state prosecution in Montenegro and the majority consider that judges do not make 
their decisions impartially (Vavić et al., 2016). 
Judicial academy 
The EU funded a project, under IPA 2012, supporting the rule of law that included several 
objectives related to judicial independence. IPA resources also targeted the capacities of the 
Judicial Training Centre, including improved teaching methodologies and an upgrading of the 
Centre to a fully independent Judicial Academy (Fagan and Sircar, 2015). 
Corruption and organised crime 
Corruption 
Montenegro has achieved some progress in the fight against corruption. However, corruption 
remains prevalent in many areas (EC, 2018e). Politicisation of public institutions, poor salaries, 
and lack of motivation and training of public servants create an enabling environment for 
corruption. The public procurement system also remains problematic, with limited access to 
information remains difficult to achieve (US DOS, 2018e). There is evidence that some 
government officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity (US DOS, 2018e). The public 
perceives corruption as endemic in the government and elsewhere in the public sector at both 
local and national levels, including in the judiciary, customs, police, political parties (US DOS, 
2018e).   
Anti-corruption 
Montenegro has in place the legal and institutional preconditions and the strategic framework for 
the prevention and prosecution of corruption (US DOS, 2018e). Agencies tasked with fighting 
corruption acknowledged that their capacity improved but remained limited and that cooperation 
and information sharing among them was inadequate (US DOS, 2018e).  
The government has not implemented the law effectively. There is a consistently poor track 
record in terms of punishing corruption, especially among high-level officials, which undermines 
public trust in institutions, their integrity and any commitment to fighting corruption (US DOS, 
2018e; McDevitt, 2016). Where cases proceed, they are usually against lower-ranked officials 
convicted of petty corruption and sentenced to prison, whereas convictions are low for larger 
corrupt acts by state officials (McDevitt, 2016). 
There has recently been limited progress in establishing an initial track record of investigation, 
prosecution and final convictions in high-level corruption cases has been established (EC, 
2018e). This is due in large part to the work of the Special Prosecutor’s Office. The Office was 
established in 2017 to fight against corruption, organised crime, war crimes, terrorism and money 
laundering. It has become more proactive and has started some investigations based on media 
and NGO reporting (BTI, 2018e; Milošević et al., 2018).  
The Office has faced obstructions to its work, however. These include criticism by the opposition 
for not opening certain cases in which the general public suspects corruption; lack of cooperation 
from the Director of Police; inability to directly access the databases of other state authorities; 
and lack of adequate capacities, IT equipment, premises and the budget necessary to conduct its 
work (BTI, 2018e; Milošević and Muk, 2016; Vavić et al., 2016). According to an opinion poll 
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conducted by the Institute Alternative, by the end of 2017 most Montenegrin citizens (56 percent) 
did not think that the Office was contributing to the fight against corruption and organised crime, 
while one fifth of citizens did not recognize that the Office was making any contribution at all to 
solving this problem (Milošević et al., 2018, 21). 
The Anti-Corruption Agency also suffers from challenges to its credibility, independence, and 
transparency (EC, 2018e; Vavić et al., 2016). Allegations of political influence and 
instrumentalisation persist due to personal ties between its management and the political elite 
(BTI, 2018e; EC, 2018e).  Inadequate capacities to perform its tasks is another key challenge, 
which requires attention (BTI, 2018e; Vavić et al., 2016). 
Montenegro has been frequently urged by the European Union to prosecute a greater number of 
high-profile corruption cases. Further improvements of the track record of successful 
investigations and convictions will only be possible in an environment where independent 
institutions are shielded from any undue political influence and given incentives to fully use their 
powers (EC, 2018e). 
Organised crime 
There is an initial track record in Montenegro of prosecutions in the fight against smuggling of 
migrants and against drug trafficking. Further results are needed, however, to produce a 
convincing track record, particularly in the fight against money laundering and trafficking in 
human beings (EC, 2018e). 
Media freedom and protection 
Montenegro’s poor rankings on media freedom indicate a worrisome situation (Milošević et al., 
2018). The country has achieve some progress in the area of freedom of expression (EC, 
2018e). However, institutional capacity to ensure freedom of expression and media protection 
remains weak (Vavić et al., 2016).  The media landscape remains highly polarised and 
challenges in understanding the role of free media persist (EC, 2018e). 
Journalists who investigate corruption cases are often accused of being a threat to national 
interests (McDevitt, 2016).  While new attacks have emerged, there have yet to be any notable 
developments regarding investigations into old cases of violence against journalists (EC, 2018e). 
Such harassment, threats and attacks result in self-censorship by journalists, who refrain from 
investigating sensitive issues and from criticising the government or other power interests 
(McDevitt, 2016). 
Montenegro established the Commission for Monitoring Competent Authorities in Investigating 
Cases of Intimidation and Violence Against Journalists in 2014. It has faced many challenges 
and obstacles, however. This included lack of cooperation by the police, such as limiting timely 
access to relevant data. There were also issues of conflict of interest, as some members of the 
Commission who were investigating attacks on journalists had come from the police or the 
prosecutor’s office, the same bodies that were the subject of scrutiny from the Commission 
(Milošević et al., 2018). 
Minority protection 
The EU’s 2016 Progress Report highlights that the Romani minority remains the most vulnerable 
and discriminated community in various areas, including representation in politics, access to the 
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labour market and to health care (BTI, 2018e; EC, 2018e). According to the Roma Education 
Fund, the poverty rate among Romani, Ashkali, and Balkan Egyptians was 36 percent compared 
to 11 percent for the general population (US DOS, 2018e, 27). Gender-based violence and 
violence against children also remains a serious concern in the country (EC, 2018e). 
Other ethnic minorities, in particular Albanians and Bosniaks in the northern and southern parts 
of the country, complained often that they suffered from discrimination by central government 
and economic neglect.  Ethnic Serbian politicians also claimed that the government discriminated 
against the Serbian national identity, language, and religion (US DOS, 2018e). 
Montenegro has made progress in adopting anti-discrimination legislation, however 
implementation of the legislation remains weak. The country needs to ensure that adequate 
institutional mechanisms and capacity are in place to protect vulnerable groups from 
discrimination (EC, 2018e). 
Asylum framework 
Decision on whether to accept refugees in Montenegro is, in the final instance, purely political, with 
the government deciding whether to accept refugees. This was reiterated at the February 2016 
parliamentary control hearing of the minister of labour and social care (Vavić et al., 2016). 
8. Serbia 
Judicial independence 
While Serbia has made progress in the Europeanisation of judicial independence, various 
problems concerning judicial independence, impartiality and accountability persist. The judiciary 
in Serbia is not considered to be independent, but rather influenced by political influences and 
pressures from the executive. The current reforms, adhering to European standards, encourage 
separation of powers, but this has not been implemented in Serbia. The country’s constitution 
establishes judicial independence as a principle and rule, but it still also stipulates that the three 
branches of power are to control each other, which leaves room for influence on the judiciary 
(BTI, 2018f; EC, 2018f; Gome, 2017). It is thus potentially risky to remove any oversight by 
legislative and executive branches in the judiciary. The current European consensus on self-
governance of the judiciary is pushing Serbia in that direction, however, resulting in possible 
adverse consequences (Fagan and Sircar, 2015).  
Perceptions of judicial independence remains low in Serbia, declining over time. This undermines 
the credibility of the judicial system and users’ trust and confidence in it (World Bank, 2014). 
Prosecutors are considered autonomous but not yet independent, working under excessive 
influence of the executive (Elek et al., 2016). 
The implementation of comprehensive reforms to the judicial system and rule of law in Serbia 
require not only significant training and educational programs, but the transformation of long held 
traditional beliefs and attitudes by the judiciary as well as the executive (Gome, 2017). 
Judicial and prosecutorial councils 
Amendments to the Law on the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the Law on the State 
Prosecutorial Council (SPC) were adopted in December 2015. While the councils have continued 
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to build their capacity, they have not yet fully assumed their role due to legislative and 
administrative delays (EC, 2018f).  Specifically, the transfer of full responsibility for the judicial 
budget from the Ministry of Justice to the councils has been repeatedly delayed. Both councils 
need to improve their capacity for strategic, budget and human resources planning, and for 
public communication. They also need to improve the transparency of their work, including by 
publishing decisions on and giving full reasons for appointments and promotions (EC, 2018f).  
Specific ongoing problems with the councils’ appointments and promotions include the 
persistence of political pressure in the election of prosecutors and judges (Elek et al., 2016) and 
limited progress in establishing a fully objective, transparent and merit-based system for the 
appointment of judges and prosecutors (BTI, 2018f; EC, 2018f; Milošević and Muk, 2016). The 
work of the Judicial Council has been compromised by lack of clear criteria in decision-making; 
problems with the selection its members; bans on making voting and other Council proceedings 
public, and inconsistency in the implementation of (re)appointments, due to long-standing 
political pressure in Serbia’s judiciary  (Bokic, 2017). 
There is evidence of the appointments of prosecutors and court presidents based on political ties 
in several prominent cases (McDevitt, 2016). The three-year probation period for judges affects 
the independence of the judicial system as newly-appointed judges may feel they have to act in 
particular ways in order to become permanent (Gome, 2017; Fagan and Sircar, 2015). In addition 
judicial salaries remain low, thus producing an environment conducive to corruption (Gome, 
2017). 
In the absence of an enabling culture and environment for prescribed judicial reforms, the 
situation in Serbia is considered by some to have worsened with the establishment of a judicial 
council, as the new institution has slowed down reform activities in Serbia (Bošković, 2015). In 
particular, the institutional design of the judicial councils is such as to give prominence to more 
senior members of the judiciary, possibly by appointment and re-electing them to important 
positions in the council and in the courts. In transitional societies, however, those with more 
experience are more likely to adhere to the old system and other values than those that the 
current reforms are trying to achieve (Bošković, 2015). 
Judicial academy 
The core issue in reforming judicial independence in Serbia, as in other countries in the Western 
Balkans, has been the understanding and application of the concept of “independence” amongst 
judicial practitioners. In order to transform understanding and behaviour among current and new 
judicial practitioners, the EU and other international actors have focused their efforts on 
establishing and continually improving the Judicial Academy (Fagan, 2016). The adoption of the 
Law on the Judicial Academy in 2009 established its responsibility for initial and continuous 
training of judicial practitioners (judges, prosecutors and court assistants) (Fagan, 2016). 
The process of upgrading the Judicial Training Centre in Serbia into a national Academy has 
relied heavily on EU assistance and support. Judges and lawyers in the country have depicted 
the Judicial Academy as a positive example of internationally assisted judicial reform. This is to 
the extent that it has actively involved civil society in its trainings, and is considered to have the 
potential to become a forum where judges can openly discuss political interference and threats to 
their independence (Fagan, 2016).  There have been setbacks to the development of the 
Academy into a full-fledged national training authority, however. In particular, the Constitutional 
Court declared that graduates of the Academy could no longer be treated preferentially and 
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guaranteed immediate employment and the support of the High Judicial Council (Fagan, 2016). 
There are also concerns that the Academy lacks sufficient independence, evident by the fact that 
the Ministry of Justice holds much influence over the composition of the Academy. Creating a 
more powerful Academy, without resolving the problem of governmental interference, renders it 
at a high risk of political influence (Fagan, 2016). 
In order to improve the functioning of the Academy, further reforms are needed to increase its 
power in relation to the executive; to increase its capacity as a training and professional 
standards body; to improve the quality and responsiveness of training programmes; and also to 
better link it with the High Judicial Council (EC, 2018f; Fagan, 2016). 
Vetting 
While Serbia has adopted the basic legislative conditions and founding stones for vetting, the 
current government has failed to design a comprehensive vetting process and institutional 
restructuring. This is due in large part to a lack of political will (Maxhuni and Cucchi, 2017). There 
are also concerns that Serbia’s vetting measures may be incompatible with European fair trial  
standards as the re-appointment procedures for existing judges allows for the possibility of 
removal of judges from office who are not guilty of any misbehaviour (Anastasi, 2018). 
Judicial efficiency 
Serbia’s judicial system performs at a lower standard than that of EU member states (World 
Bank, 2014). Judicial efficiency and public confidence in the judiciary is undermined by a large 
backlog of cases; inadequate levels of competence; a high level of bureaucracy and red tape; 
and unchecked procedural abuses (Gome, 2017; Elek et al., 2016 World Bank, 2014). There has 
been some progress, notably a reduction in the backlog of old enforcement cases and the 
adoption of measures to harmonise court practice (EC, 2018f). 
Access to justice 
Access to justice is hindered by high legal fees; lack of an efficient free legal aid system and delays 
in the adoption of the Law on Free Legal Aid; the poor availability and quality of performance of 
appointed defence lawyers; delays in case processing; inefficient procedures  for awarding 
compensation; and weak enforcement of final judgments (EC, 2018f; World Bank, 2014). Women 
experience the judicial system differently from men. In particular, they are more likely to experience 
barriers to access to justice and to find attorney fees to be cost-prohibitive (World Bank, 2014). 
Corruption and organised crime 
Corruption 
Corruption remains a serious and widespread problem in Serbia, typically embedded in the state 
(EC, 2018f; Ciero, 2016). Serbia lags EU member states and neighbouring countries on all 
comparative indices of perceived corruption in the judiciary (World Bank, 2014). The prevalence 
of corruption stems in large part from inadequate investigation; corrupt judges and politicians; 
insufficient sentencing; and lack of coordination of anti-corruption efforts (Cierco, 2016). 
While corruption is classified as a crime in the Serbian Penal Code, it is not stated as corruption, 
but is covered instead by “crimes against the office”, which includes abuse of the official function 
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(Gome, 2017). EU experts noted problems with the overuse of the vague “abuse of office” charge 
(US DOS, 2018f).   
Justice and political parties are the two institutions most affected by corruption (Transparency 
International; cited in Gome, 2017).  Corruption is a weak point of the judiciary. An analysis, 
conducted by the UNDP and Transparency International, finds that 82 percent of people 
surveyed in Serbia think the judiciary is the most corrupt institution in the country and 63 percent 
did not trust the courts (Avramovic, 2015). High ranking politicians continue to influence courts, at 
times publicly criticising court proceedings (BTI, 2018f). Judicial salaries remain low, resulting in 
an environment conducive to corruption (Gome, 2017). Bribery of court staff seems to be more 
common than the bribery of judges (World Bank, 2014). The presence of corruption, in turn, 
hinders judicial reforms. Corruption remains a threat to rule of law and the development of 
democracy (Avramovic, 2015). The Anti-corruption Council and the NGO Transparency Serbia 
point to a continued lack of governmental transparency (US DOS, 2017f). 
Anti-corruption 
There has been some progress in the fight against corruption in Serbia (EC, 2018f; Elek et al., 
2016). The country has established the legal framework to fight corruption, abuse of power and 
other corrupt practices, including more recently the introduction of whistle-blower protection (BTI, 
2018f).  EU funding has supported significant improvements in Serbia’s institutional framework 
for fighting corruption, including the adoption of better laws and amendments; establishment of 
anti-corruption agencies and strategies, action plans for information and prevention activities; 
and addressing of conflict of interest issues in public administration (EC, 2018f; Ciero, 2016).  
Various challenges remain in countering corruption, including: violation of anti-corruption laws; 
lack of sufficient capacities and equipment of entities involved in anti-corruption; and lack of 
transparency in decision-making processes (Ciero, 2016). In addition, there has been a serious 
delay in adopting the new law on the Anti-Corruption Agency, in order to enable it to better 
assume its role as the key institution in this area (BTI, 2018f; EC, 2018f). There is also confusing 
overlap in the mandates and tasks of the three key organisations associated with anti-corruption 
(the Anti-Corruption Agency of Serbia (ACAS), the Group for Coordination of Implementation of 
the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the newly established Government's Coordination Body for 
Implementation of the Action Plan). This contributes to unsatisfactory implementation of the 
Strategy and Action Plan (Elek et al., 2016; McDevitt, 2016). Lack of cooperation among anti-
corruption, judicial and law enforcement bodies also undermines the ability to effectively counter 
corruption (McDevitt, 2016). 
The Anti-Corruption Council, in its advisory role to the government, has remained active in 
exposing and analysing cases of systemic corruption. The government, however, has not 
systematically follow up on its recommendations. It also did not follow the Council’s rules of 
procedure and appointed two new members of the Council without consulting it (EC, 2018f).   
The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials (US DOS, 2017f). However, there is 
a limited track record of investigations, indictments and final convictions in corruption cases 
involving high-level public officials (BTI, 2018f; McDevitt, 2016). Instead, allegations of corruption 
among politicians are often used as a political weapon against other parties and leaders (BTI, 
2018f). This all contributes to a lack of public trust in the institutions connected to fighting 
corruption. 
Organised crime 
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Serbia also remains vulnerable to organised crime, despite some progress toward countering it 
(EC 2018f; Ciero, 2016). Progress was made in various areas, such as improvements in human 
resource management in the Ministry of the Interior and the police and in the operational capacity 
of the Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime and the Prosecutor's Office for Cybercrime (EC, 
2018f). There have also been improvements in the institutional framework, with the adoption of a 
new strategy and action plan to prevent and fight trafficking in human beings and a new Law on 
the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing; and the appointment of a National 
Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (EC, 2018f). Despite these 
developments, Serbia has yet to establish an initial track record of effective financial 
investigations; there are still very few convictions for organised crime (EC, 2018f).  
In order to effectively tackle organised crime, law enforcement agencies in Serbia need to 
establish a better track record; enhance their analytical capacities; improve inter-institutional 
cooperation; and create regional networks for fighting organised crime (Elek et al., 2016). Elek et 
al. (2016) finds that a key milestone in the development of analytical capacities was reached with 
the production and publishing of the first national Serious and Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment (SOCTA) in 2016. The report aims to improve the effectiveness of police work in the 
fight against organised crime and to allow for more efficient use of human and technical 
resources. In order to have a genuine impact on policies and the work of law enforcement 
agencies, though, SOCTA needs to be operationalised and applied (Elek et al., 2016). There 
also needs to be greater progress with establishing a reliable criminal-intelligence system, in 
order to allow for efficient and secure exchange of information between various law enforcement 
agencies. Currently, this exchange is undermined by various non-compatible systems of data 
collection and formats across institutions, making it difficult, for example, to trace a single case 
throughout the judicial system (Elek et al., 2016).  
Corruption and organised crime in Serbia contribute to the lack of trust of the citizens in existing 
institutions.  According to the Eurobarometer (2013), the majority of Serbs tend to not trust in 
national political institutions (67 percent do not trust in the national government and 70 percent in 
the national parliament (see Cierco, 2016, 125). 
War crimes prosecution 
The war crimes prosecutorial strategy has been severely delayed. A draft strategy was published 
in March 2018. Key elements for the prosecutorial strategy include investigating and prosecuting 
the perpetrators most responsible for the crimes irrespective of their rank; a victims-focused 
approach, with particular attention to witness protection; and strengthened cooperation among 
various stakeholders (EC, 2018f).   
There have been various challenges in carrying out war crimes prosecutions in Serbia. These 
include significant delays in the appointment of additional deputy prosecutors; the practice by the 
executive of publicly commenting on trials, undermining judicial independence; statements by 
senior politicians calling into question ICTY rulings; and the politicisation of investigations (EC, 
2018f; McDevitt, 2016). 
While progress was made with regard to prosecutions for sexual violence in the ICTY and by 
local courts in BiH, the Special War Crimes Chamber in Belgrade has concluded only two trials 
for rape relating to the conflict over Kosovo (Ungar, 2017) 
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Media freedom and protection 
There have been worsening tendencies and backsliding in the exercise of freedom of expression, 
freedom of the press and media plurality in Serbia (Huska, 2018; Elek et al., 2016), with a rise in 
self-censorship and undue influence on editorial policies and websites (McDevitt, 2016). This 
downward trend is considered to be linked to the broader political context, in particular the 
authoritarian tendencies of the government (Huszka, 2018; Marić and Bajić, 2018). While 
independent media organisations were generally active and expressed a diversity of views, there 
were reports that the government pressured media by withholding advertising, abusing tax 
audits, and restricting access to public information (US DOS, 2017f). Further, the Anti-Corruption 
Council report confirms key problems with fostering an independent media in Serbia. They 
include: non-transparency of media ownership; non-transparent financing and economic 
pressure through the budget; and censorship and self-censorship (Marić and Bajić, 2018). 
Huszka, (2018) critiques the EU for not having sanctioned Serbia for the lack of compliance with 
meeting EU conditions on freedom of speech and media freedom (Huszka, 2018). 
Intimidation of journalists, threats, intimidation and violence against journalists remain a concern. 
There are numerous credible reports of verbal and physical attacks against journalists; and 
attacks against the property of journalists (EC, 2018f: US DOS, 2018f).  
The law in Serbia prohibits threatening or otherwise putting pressure on public media and 
journalists or exerting any other kind of influence that might obstruct their work (US DOS, 2018f). 
Serbia needs to elaborate guidelines, clarifying their classification as criminal or other type of 
offences and closely monitor their follow-up by the law enforcement authorities. Several cases 
have been solved and some criminal charges filed, but authorities rarely file criminal charges in 
the case of threats against journalists. Moreover, there are still few convictions, resulting in a 
climate of impunity (EC, 2018f; Marić and Bajić, 2018). 
Minority protection 
Serbia has a strong legislative framework in place, aligned with EU standards, concerning 
guaranteeing and protecting human rights and protection minorities from discrimination. This 
includes the introduction of the concept of a “hate crime”. The country also has an institutional 
framework in place, with the Office for Human and Minority Rights and the Equality 
Commissioner’s Office, established to implement anti-discrimination legislation. Implementation 
of the legal framework remains problematic though, lacking a positive track record (BTI, 2018f; 
Marić and Bajić, 2018; Elek et al., 2016).  This is largely due to budgetary weaknesses and poor 
levels of human resources in the organisations. In addition, prosecutors and judges tend not to 
have sufficient anti-discrimination knowledge, often resulting in misapplication of the notion of 
discrimination, despite the existence of some training sessions (Marić and Bajić, 2018). 
A survey examining discrimination and violence against minorities ranks Serbia 95th out of 128 
examined countries, amounting to the weakest results of all the EU member states and 
enlargement countries (see Marić and Bajić, 2018, p. 22). The Romani are considered to be 
subject to the greatest discrimination of any ethnic minority in Serbia. They continue to face 
prejudices and discrimination in society, particularly poor access to employment, health and 
education services; sub-standard living conditions; forced eviction; and discriminatory treatment 
in the media and public discourse (BTI, 2018f; US DOS, 2017f; Elek et al., 2016). This is despite 
positive developments with the adoption of a government strategy for social inclusion of Roma 
and the establishment of a new Regional Roma Office (Elek et al., 2016). 
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Other marginalised groups in Serbia include LGBTI persons, persons with disabilities, and 
victims of gender-based violence. While research from 2016 indicates that a large majority of 
citizens reject direct, physical violence towards LGBTI persons, they do not perceive other forms 
of violence (i.e. demeaning insults, avoidance, discrimination in the work place etc.) as such 
(Elek et al., 2016). In 2017, the first openly LGBTI Prime Minister was appointed in Serbia. 
Nonetheless, discrimination and violence against LGBTI person remains widespread (Marić and 
Bajić, 2018). 
Persons with disabilities suffer from inaccessibility of facilities and services, despite the existence 
of a sufficient normative framework. They have submitted the third largest share of complains to 
the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, demonstrating significant obstacles in their 
ability to exercise their rights (Elek et al., 2016). 
Gender equality has also deteriorated, with the country declining in its ranking in the World 
Economic Forum’s 2016 Gender Equality Gap Index. Results were particularly troubling in the 
area of political empowerment of women (see Elek et al., 2016). 
Asylum framework 
Serbia was massively affected by the “refugee crisis” in 2015-16. While the EU and the EC 
praised the country’s performance during the crisis, EC country reports have highlighted key 
problems and deficiencies of the Serbian asylum system. This relates to a deficient 
implementation of the asylum law in force; slow and ineffective asylum procedure; lack of human 
resources; knowledge and skills of the existing staff on asylum matters, which results in deficient 
asylum decisions; and the lack of accommodation capacities (Imeri et al., 2018; Marić and Bajić, 
2018). These constraints have undermined the access of asylum seekers to prompt and effective 
individual assessment of their protection needs (US DOS, 2018f). Further, there is no relevant 
policy or solution for the possible permanent stay of refugees. While there is a governmental 
body responsible for refugees, this body focuses more on refugees from the former Yugoslav 
territories.  While it is also responsible for taking care of refugees from Syria and other turbulent 
areas, a review of documents indicate that it deals simply with the provision of basic living needs 
for refugees on their way toward Western European countries (Stančetić, 2018). Serbia needs to 
adopt a proactive approach to developing a policy and solution for the permanent stay of 
refugees in the case of possible future events (Stančetić, 2018). 
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